

1. CAS Data	
Country: Senegal	
CAS Year: FY07	CAS Period: FY07 - FY10
CASCR Review Period: FY07 - FY11 (1 st half)	Date of this review: January 16, 2013

2. Executive Summary
<p>i. This review examines the implementation of the FY07-FY10 Senegal Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY07 and the CAS Progress Report (CASPR) of FY09, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The strategy was jointly implemented by IDA and IFC, and this review covers the joint program of the two institutions.</p> <p>ii. The broad objective of the WBG strategy was to address the challenges facing the country by maximizing synergies with the Government's PRSP and the Bank's Africa Action Plan. The CAS objectives were organized under three pillars, supported by a governance filter. On governance, the CAS sought to improve efficiency and transparency in the use of public resources, to increase the accountability of government, and to strengthen and modernize the judicial system and mechanisms for private sector governance. The three main pillars included: (i) promoting growth and wealth creation through creating a competitive investment climate, improving basic infrastructure for growth, facilitating SME access to finance, diversifying agriculture, promoting sustainable use of natural resources, and developing skilled labor and use of technology; (ii) protecting human development through improving quality of and access to basic education, improving health services provision for women and children, and protecting targeted vulnerable groups; and (iii) maximizing urban/rural synergies through improving urban mobility and access in and out of Dakar, promoting regional centers, reducing vulnerability of immigrant and emigrant groups, and improving quality of life through better management of natural resources and access to water and sanitation.</p> <p>iii. IEG rates the overall outcome of the CAS as <i>moderately unsatisfactory</i>, concurring with the CASCR rating. In all four pillars, although some objectives were achieved, a majority of them were only partially achieved and some were not achieved. Under the Governance Filter, some improvement was achieved in the budget process and in the transparency of budget execution, mostly associated with prior actions for IDA adjustment credits, but the overall progress toward improving governance was weak. Under the Growth Pillar, little progress was made toward removing key bottlenecks in the transport and energy sectors, while the overall business environment deteriorated despite encouraging regulatory reforms in some areas. Gains in agricultural diversification at the project level are yet to have a significant impact at the national level as the share of agriculture in exports and GDP declined. Good progress was achieved in managing fishing and forest resources, but little was done to reverse land degradation. Under the Human Development Pillar, good progress was achieved in broadening access to education and closing the gender gap, but there is no indication of improvement in the quality of education. In health and nutrition, there is a large disconnect between the positive results at the project level and the disappointing outcomes at the national level. Similarly, although a child-focused social cash transfer project is achieving good results, there is no information on the welfare of street children in Dakar, a target vulnerable group that the CAS aimed to protect. Finally, under the Urban-Rural Synergy Pillar, there is no evidence of improved access in and out of Dakar and congestion worsened in the city. The rehabilitation of Casamance has broadly achieved the intended outcomes, but there is no information on whether it has led to greater balance in regional development. Good progress was achieved in improving access to water and sanitation services.</p>

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iv. The CASCR identifies four lessons: long-term engagement in any given area for lasting development impact; realism in assessing what needs to be done and what can be done; a combination of different instruments in strategic sectors; and attention to the relevance and measurability of outcome indicators. IEG concurs with these and underscores three key points. First, strong commitments and follow-up actions by the Government are critical for a WBG-supported intervention to lead to broader development impact than the intervention itself. During the CAS period, many successful interventions failed to produce the desired higher-level impact due to lack of follow-up. Second, there is a need for stronger synergy between budget support operations and other WBG instruments such as AAA, TA, and investment projects. Several sectoral IDA projects would have had greater impact if better supported by the PRSC series. Third, a coordinated approach between IDA, IFC and MIGA, while relevant, needs significant effort at the working level to build synergies and mutually reinforcing support. The clear intentions of the CAS to maximize WBG synergies were not matched by close collaboration among the three institutions during CAS implementation.

3. Assessment of WBG Strategy

Overview of CAS Relevance:

Country Context

1. Given the favorable macroeconomic conditions, low debt levels, and the beginning of a new political cycle, Senegal entered the CAS period with high hopes despite emerging signs of distress. The global food and oil price shocks hit Senegal particularly hard as fuels and food products accounted for nearly half of total imports, while the global economic crisis led to the decline of remittances and tourism revenue. Poor weather conditions and weak policy performance, especially in fiscal management, contributed to the slowdown in GDP growth from 4.4 during 2000-05 to 3.4 percent during the 2006-10. Against the expectations of GDP growth in the range of 7 percent, the economic performance during the CAS period was especially disappointing. The poverty rate declined slightly from 48.5 to 46.7 percent during 2006-11. The prospects for reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are mixed, with a number of the goals off track. Senegal continued to enjoy political stability during the CAS period, although with President Wade losing control of Dakar in 2009 it became more difficult to gather broad consensus to advance reforms needed to address the short-term challenges while maintaining a focus on long-term development objectives.

2. The Senegalese Government articulated its medium-term vision in the second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-II) around four pillars: (i) wealth creation; (ii) access to basic social services; (iii) protection of vulnerable groups; and (iv) greater transparency and participatory processes. An Accelerated Growth Strategy was formulated at the same time as the PRSP-II and further developed the first pillar with a focus on improving the overall investment climate and promoting the development of five clusters with good export and job-creation potential: agribusiness, tourism, telecommunications and new technologies, textile and fisheries. A National Protection Strategy finalized in 2007 unbundled the third pillar. In addition, the Government relied on a number of guiding principles that included: preserving macroeconomic stability and reducing vulnerability to external shocks; promoting equity and protecting vulnerable groups; and balancing growth between rural and urban regions.

Objectives of the WBG Strategy

3. The broad objective of the WBG strategy was to address the challenges facing the country by maximizing synergies with the Government's PRSP and the Bank's Africa Action Plan. The CAS objectives were organized under three pillars, supported by a governance filter. On governance, the CAS sought to improve the efficiency and transparency in the use of public resources, to increase the accountability of government, and to strengthen and modernize the judicial system and mechanisms

for private sector governance. The three main pillars included: (i) promoting growth and wealth creation through creating a competitive investment climate, improving basic infrastructure for growth, facilitating SME access to finance, diversifying agriculture, promoting sustainable use of natural resources, and developing skilled labor and use of technology; (ii) protecting human development through improving quality of and access to basic education, improving health services provision for women and children, and protecting targeted vulnerable groups; and (iii) maximizing urban/rural synergies through improving urban mobility and access in and out of Dakar, promoting regional centers, reducing vulnerability of immigrant and emigrant groups, and improving quality of life through better management of natural resources and access to water and sanitation.

4. No major discrepancies existed between the text of the strategy and the supporting results framework. However, the highly selective nature of the results framework meant that it did not fully capture the scope of the strategy. The CASPR reaffirmed the relevance of the CAS, but adjusted the program to ensure effective use of enlarged IDA funds. In addition to major revisions to the results matrix, where 12 out of 26 outcome indicators were modified, the objective of developing skilled labor and use of technology under Pillar I was removed, from both the text of the CASPR and its results matrix, without any explanation.

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

5. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program:** The CAS was relevant to the country context by focusing on the key challenges facing Senegal for accelerating economic growth, closing the gaps in the delivery of social services, and in protecting the most vulnerable people. The strategy was closely aligned with the PRSP II and the complementary Accelerated Growth Strategy and National Protection Strategy. The third pillar of the CAS was aligned with the guiding principle of pursuing balanced growth between rural and urban regions, although it is not clear from the CAS how the guiding principles relate to the other strategies. Seeking to maximize synergies with other development partners, the CAS program selectively left out some key aspects of the PRSP agenda where assistance was expected from other sources.

6. **Relevance of Design.** The selection of three areas of engagement supplemented by the cross-cutting governance agenda was grounded in previous and on-going analytical work. However, the wide scope and ambitious objectives of the strategy relied on the political and technical capacity of the Government to advance policy reforms. A more focused approach would have facilitated achieving results in some critical areas. The strategy tested the Bank's capacity to deliver the expected results given the instruments available. Specifically, although the Bank appropriately used different lending operations and analytical work to pursue CAS objectives, the achievement of key policy reform objectives called for a strong technical assistance (TA) program to complement the budget support through policy lending. Such a TA program was not in place. More importantly, delivering on the CAS objectives relied critically on the ownership and follow-up of the Government in the reform areas and on the Bank instruments to have a significant catalytic effect on the policy efforts. Consideration was not given to the factors that could affect the ability of the Government to deliver on its commitments and to a clear pathway that could translate and replicate project level outcomes into country-wide results. Finally, the third pillar of the strategy lacked coherence – urban and inter-city transport was an important part of the basic infrastructure for growth; street children made up a major vulnerable group for targeted protection; water and sanitation provisions were key components of social services; while natural resource management was pursued under the first pillar despite being mentioned here. It is not clear what rural-urban synergies would be achieved through the WBG program.

7. **Strength of the Results Framework.** The CAS had a strong focus on results and articulated a reasonable results chain linking IDA interventions to desired outcomes to higher-level country goals. Nevertheless, the CAS results framework had several major shortcomings that significantly reduced its usefulness as a management tool for guiding program implementation. The results matrix demonstrated certain confusion between CAS outcomes (objectives that the Bank aimed to achieve during the CAS period) and outcome indicators (measurements to be used to gauge achievement of the objectives). Consequently, all the CAS outcomes were narrowly defined as numeric targets that

did not always show a clear link with the country goals. For example, the link between CAS outcome of “75 percent of surveyed children showing adequate weight gain” and the country goal of “improving protection of targeted vulnerable groups” was indirect and tenuous. Furthermore, the results matrix captured only a sub-set of the CAS program, but there was no explanation on why some (important) issues were left out. For example, very ambitious goals and activities were described in the area of governance, but then were not followed up in the results matrix. Similarly, although the strategy emphasized the improvement in the quality of basic education, all the outcomes in the results matrix sought to measure progress in terms of enrollment and repetition rates. Finally, a major shortcoming was that most of the outcomes (*de facto* outcome indicators) were specific to individual IDA lending operations and did not reflect the aggregate contribution of the WBG. In particular, IFC interventions were poorly captured by the indicators, to the extent that apart from three projects already on-going at the start of the CAS period, the expected outcomes could very well be achieved had the CAS been an IDA-only strategy. The IFC program, which was described in Annex 3 of the CAS instead of the main text of the CAS, was largely excluded from the results matrix.

8. **Risk Identification and Mitigation.** The CAS identified three categories of risks: (i) governance and resistance to policy reforms from vested interests; (ii) vulnerability to shocks and volatility of donor support; and (iii) insufficient institutional capacity. However, it did not propose specific mitigation remedies to deal with these risks. The CASPR reconfirmed the validity of these risks, all of which did materialize to some extent, and highlighted the overriding risks associated with external shocks. Nevertheless, no real mitigation measures were discussed beyond continued monitoring through close engagement with the Government and donor partners.

Overview of CAS Implementation:

Lending and Investments

9. At the inception of the CAS period, IDA had a portfolio of 15 projects totaling \$631 million. During the CAS period, total new IDA lending amounted to \$692.3 million in 20 operations, compared to the planned lending program of 13 projects totaling \$420 million in the CAS and 17 projects totaling \$593 million in the CASPR. The additional finance was in part a response to new financing needs arisen from a succession of shocks experienced by Senegal, and in part an adjustment to the original program with increased IDA allocation. A trust fund portfolio of 28 operations provided \$144.8 million, of which 62 percent has gone for education. Agriculture, fisheries and the environment received 23 percent.

10. IDA’s portfolio quality compared favorably to the Africa Region average, but was volatile, with the proportion of projects at risk going from 23.5 percent in 2007 down to zero in 2009, then up to 20 percent in 2010 before coming down again to 15.8 percent in 2011. IEG reviewed the completion report of 11 projects completed during the CAS period and rated the development outcome as *satisfactory* in 4 projects, *moderately satisfactory* in 4 projects, *moderately unsatisfactory* in 2 projects and *unsatisfactory* in 1 projects. This result indicates a higher success rate (72.7 percent) than the regional average (65.3 percent). The Implementation Status Reports rate 82 percent of the 17 projects under implementation as *satisfactory* as of November 28, 2012. The disbursement ratio improved from 12.2 percent in 2008 to 21.1 percent in 2011. As of November 2012, it stood at 16.7 percent.

11. At the inception of the CAS period, the IFC had 6 active investments totaling \$36.7 million; during the CAS period, IFC committed \$94.1 million in 10 new projects, of which 96.5 percent were in loans. This commitment volume is about four times the amount of US\$23.8 million committed in the previous CAS cycle, and the 10 projects represent a five-fold increase over the previous period’s 2 projects. A third of the IFC’s investment was in a toll road (\$30.5 million); followed by a trade finance project (\$17.4 million), and a hotel (\$10.5 million). IFC also invested in 2 microfinance operations, 2 rural electrification projects, 2 agribusiness companies, and a cement project. In spite of the commitment volumes, as of June 30, 2010, IFC’s disbursed and outstanding portfolio in Senegal was

\$54.6 million, compared to \$80.7 million on June 30, 2007 and \$92.3 million on June 30, 2008. The drop reflects, in part, the relatively shorter term nature of IFC's investments in the country and the rise in cancellations and prepayments in the portfolio.

12. There were no IEG-reviewed XPSRs during the CAS period. IFC's own assessment through the Development Outcome Tracking System (DOTS) indicates that all six projects that were under implementation at the start of the CAS period were either *highly unsuccessful or mostly unsuccessful* in terms of their development outcomes. Among the 10 new commitments, 7 were categorized as "Too Early to Tell", one project in Trade Finance cannot be rated, and of the balance 2 projects, one (in agribusiness) was cancelled before disbursement and the other (a cement project) was prepaid, although its portfolio supervision reports suggested a mostly successful outcome.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

13. Most of the planned Economic and Sector Work (ESW) tasks were delivered, albeit with some important delays. Of the 24 tasks delivered, three were unplanned activities related to disaster need assessment and coastal erosion protection. The delays in delivery were particularly important in FY08, where only two of the seven planned activities were delivered. The AAA program supported the main priority areas of the CAS and the lending program. One weakness of the program was the constant postponement of a multi-sector Public Expenditure Review (PER); in the end it covered only health, education, and transport sectors. Given the Bank's important role in coordinating donor support and the key objective of improving efficiency and transparency in the use of public resources, an early PER would have been more consistent with the overall strategy.

14. IFC implemented 2 pre-existing and 7 new advisory services (AS) projects, compared to 3 projects in the previous CAS cycle. These projects included capacity building to MSMEs via the rollout of the Business Edge and SME Toolkit products and increased access to finance for MSMEs via support to IFC investment clients in banking and microfinance institutions. Access to finance for MSMEs has also benefited from the Africa Leasing Facility to promote leasing as an alternative financing mechanism. A project in Corporate Governance was carried out to prepare Senegal's first Corporate Governance Code. All but one project were closed at the end of the CAS period, of which three were rated by the IFC team as *successful/ mostly successful* for their development effectiveness, two were rated as *unsuccessful/ mostly unsuccessful*, two thought development effectiveness "not applicable", and two were terminated after approval. Overall, the projects delivered did not resemble what was laid out in the CAS, namely interventions in agribusiness, education, tourism, telecom, or the development of the domestic bond market.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

15. Most bilateral and multilateral agencies were active in Senegal and the PRSP process helped the overall coordination. The CAS consultation process promoted selectivity and division of labor, but also complementarities. Key areas such as support to the livestock sector, banking and telecommunications became major areas of emphasis by donors. Joint activities were planned in water and roads. Complementarities in lending vehicles were also planned - the Bank focusing on budgetary support while donors focusing in supportive investment projects. During the food crisis multi donor trust funds became particularly important, providing additional financing for a rapid response child focused social cash transfer and Nutrition Security interventions.

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

16. In the period FY08-FY12, INT recorded 13 allegations of fraud and corruption, and found sufficient basis to open 7 cases. None of these was substantiated.

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

Filter: Mainstreaming governance

17. Under the governance filter, the CAS supported an ambitious agenda that included (i) improving the efficiency and transparency in the use of public resources; (ii) increasing the accountability of government through decentralization, stronger institutions, and better information; and (iii) strengthening and modernizing the judicial system and mechanisms for private sector governance. The CASPR revised 6 out of the 7 outcome indicators in the CAS by considerably reducing the scope of the progress sought after and linking them closely to IDA projects, indeed, to the prior actions under IDA credits.

18. ***Improving efficiency and transparency in the use of public resources.*** The CASCR reports that the three outcome targets, all of which drew on the prior actions under IDA's Public Financial Support Credit (PFSC), were met. However, these targets focused on budget preparation and disclosure, and did not capture changes in the efficiency in government resource utilization. The CASCR highlights as a major achievement the introduction of the Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) in 2009, which was discarded as an intermediate outcome target in the CASPR. By 2011, 21 line ministries have developed a sector MTEF and a new Public Finance Management (PFM) law had been approved in line with regional commitments under West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Despite the adoption of MTEF, however, the link between sector policies and priorities and the budget remain weak, and the MTEFs are not fully disclosed on the documents sent to Parliament. The Government's effort to clear budgetary arrears with the private sector was also met with mixed success as arrears returned and represented 10 percent of total expenditures in 2011. Senegal's percentile ranking on the World Bank Institute's (WBI) Government Effectiveness indicator deteriorated from 44.9 to 39.8 percent during 2006-11; its score on Global Competitiveness Report's (CGR) Wastefulness of Government Spending indicator deteriorated from 2.9 to 2.5 (out of 7) between 2007/08 and 2011/12; and its CPIA score on Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management remained at 3.5 during 2007-11.

19. IDA supported this objective through the Poverty Reduction Support Credit series (PRSC III-V, FY07, FY10 and FY11), the PFSC (FY09), which was an emergency operation during the crises to assist the authorities in addressing key fiscal concerns that emerged, and the Public Expenditure Financial Assessment (PEFA, FY08).

20. ***Increase public sector accountability through decentralization, stronger institutions and better information.*** The CASCR reports that all three outcome targets, two of which were linked to prior actions of IDA credits, were achieved. Nevertheless, the CASCR notes that while the capacity of the municipalities and rural communities improved, transfer of resources to local governments remained far below the level estimated to adequately finance the decentralized responsibilities. Moreover, even though an audit of procurement transactions was carried out in 2009 with support from the IDA's Private Investment Promotion Project (PIPP, FY03-FY12), it is not clear whether such independent audit was repeated on an annual basis (per CAS target). The information on budget outcomes is published within 30 days and available on the web. The progress at IDA project level is reflected in the improvement in Senegal's CPIA score for Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector from 3.0 in 2007 to 3.5 in 2011. Senegal's CGR score on Diversion of Public Funds and Favoritisms of Government Decisions also improved. On the other hand, Senegal's percentile ranking on WBI's Voice and Accountability and Control and Corruption indicators continued to decline during 2006-11, from 48.1 to 39.0 percent and from 39.5 to 31.8 percent, respectively.

21. In addition to the lending operations cited above, IDA support for this objective also included the Participatory Local Development Program (LDP, FY06-FY12), the Local Authorities Development Program (FY07), the PIPP, and AAA focusing on outreach.

22. **Strengthening and modernizing the judicial system and mechanisms for private sector governance.** The outcome target (the only one not revised in the CASPR) was not met. The time required for Enforcing Contract went up, rather than down, according to the 2011 Doing Business (DB) report, while its percentile ranking on WBI's Rule of Law indicator declined from 48.8 to 40.8 percent between 2006 and 2011. IDA supported this objective through the PIPP and an Economic Governance Project approved in FY10.

23. IEG rates the outcome of the WBG assistance under the Governance Filter as *moderately unsatisfactory*. There is no indication that sufficient progress has been made in the three areas of engagement. While some improvement was achieved in the budget process as part of specific project outcomes, in particular prior actions, and some gains were made in the transparency of budget execution, there is no evidence of appreciable improvement in the efficiency of public resource utilization, public sector accountability and the judicial system for private sector governance.

Pillar I: Promoting growth / wealth creation

24. The PRSP-II set the goal of reaching 7 percent of GDP growth rate in order to achieve the MDGs. To support the Government's accelerated growth agenda, the CAS program focused on (i) promoting a competitive investment climate; (ii) building and maintaining basic infrastructure for growth; (iii) facilitating access to financial resources by SMEs; (iv) promoting a modern and diversified agriculture; and (v) promoting sustainable development and management of natural resources.

25. **Promoting a competitive investment climate.** In 2009, Senegal was recognized by the DB as the best reformer in Africa: the time and cost required to start a business were reduced by 86 and 32 percent, respectively; the number of documents and time required to trade were reduced by over 45 and over 30 percent, respectively, (although the cost to trade increased); and the time required to register a property was reduced by 14 percent. As a result, Senegal's overall Ease of Doing Business ranking jumped from the 168th in 2008 to the 149th in 2009. However, the reform momentum was not maintained in the following years. With little further improvement (except for an additional reduction in the cost to obtain a construction permit and the time to trade), Senegal's overall DB ranking declined between 2009 and 2013. Of the 42 Sub-Saharan African countries covered by the latest DB report, Senegal is in the 32nd position. The GCR confirms the lack of progress in Senegal's Overall Competitiveness and its Goods Markets Efficiency - its scores improved marginally from 3.6 to 3.7 and from 4.0 to 4.1, respectively, during 2007/08-2011/12. The CASCR suggests that weaknesses in the monitoring of reform implementation have prevented achievement of concrete improvements on the ground.

26. The PIPP and the Private Sector Adjustment Credit (PSAC, FY04) were the main instruments of IDA support for this objective. Both projects had mixed success, were restructured and extended. The latest ISR rated the development outcome of PIPP as *moderately unsatisfactory*, while the IEG rated that of PSAC as *unsatisfactory*. PRSC IV also supported the creation of a one-stop shop for the issuance of building permits in Dakar, which reduced the time needed substantially. In addition, IDA delivered an Investment Climate Assessment in FY09. IFC conducted a review of OHADA uniform acts and their implementation, which fell far short of its commitment to work closely with IDA to improve the investment climate by using the DB methodology. The CASCR has little to comment on this subject.

27. **Building and maintaining basic infrastructure for growth.** Senegal was fortunate to have one of the best road networks in the region and one of the widest electricity coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, little progress seems to have been made during the CAS period to keep up with increased demand. The GCR reports an overall deterioration in the Adequacy of Infrastructure from 2008 to 2012, with the corresponding score dropping from 3.0 to 2.5.

28. In the transport sector, as traffic increased, the need for proper and timely upkeep became critical. To respond to this need, a second generation road fund (FERA) became operational in 2009 and funding for road maintenance increased in part through improved collection of user charges. The

GCR's Quality of Roads indicator suggests an improvement as Senegal's score increased from 2.6 to 3.2 during 2007/08-2012/13, although its ranking did not improve (from 96/131 to 97/144). However, the CAS target of improving the quality of the core road network was not met, and the 2009 PER suggests that the road maintenance implemented may not be the most appropriate. A key Bank intervention in the transport sector was the large (\$105 million) Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Highway (FY09), where IDA is financing urban restructuring and environment protection to complement the road construction undertaken by the Government and other donors. IFC committed \$30 million in SENAC, the Senegalese special purpose company that won the concession. The PRSC series tracked progress in setting up and financing FERA; while a Western/Central African Air Transport Project (FY09) was added when additional financing became available. IDA analytical work included a PER on transport.

In the energy sector, the sharp spike in oil prices in 2007 significantly impacted the financial situations of SENELEC, the state-owned supplier of electricity in the country. Since then, no progress has been made in improving SENELEC's performance, and the outcome target on new electricity tariff structure was not achieved. Governance issues in the sector remain paramount. On the positive side, some progress was made in the development and use of Public Private Partnership (PPP) for power generation and rural electrification. This has led to increased access to electricity in rural Senegal, achieving the relevant outcome target. The Bank's support in the energy sector included two unsuccessful interventions: the Electricity Sector Efficiency Enhancement Program Phase 1 APL (FY05-FY11) did not achieve two thirds of the project development objectives and closed with 62 percent of the credit cancelled; the Energy Sector Recovery Development Policy Financing (FY08) was a two tranche operation whose design up-fronted disbursements and back-loaded reforms in spite of the CAS explicitly stating that funding for this project was going to depend on strong performance in the sector. When intended reforms, including a new electricity tariff, were not delivered, the second tranche was cancelled. A parallel operation, the Electricity Services for the Rural Areas Project (FY05), has had limited impact on expanding rural services due to delays and governance issues of the Senegal Rural Electrification Agency. IFC committed an \$18 million loan in an Independent Power Producer (Kounoune IPP) in FY07, although project has faced serious challenges and is performing below expectations; and \$1.5 million in equity in a concessionaire for two rural electrification projects. A second IPP was initiated, but dropped after an AS technical review because there was no interest from investors.

29. **Facilitating access to financial resources by SMEs.** Although the GCR consistently identified access to finance as the biggest constraint to doing business in Senegal during 2008-11, it reported progress in the Ease of Access to Loans, with its score improving from 1.8 to 2.4 (0 to 7) and its ranking from 129/131 to 100/142. The CAS outcome target was not met when the IDA/IFC Partial Credit Guarantees to facilitate SME access to financial resources failed to materialize. The suspension of the PIPP project during 2008 due to fiduciary reason affected achievement of the outcome. However, two IFC microfinance projects (Microcred and Saint Louis Finance – Fides) helped facilitate MSME access to finance by investing in two Greenfield financial institutions which grew rapidly while keeping the NPLs within limits. Both investments were accompanied by IFC AS of \$1 million each, which were the largest AS projects in Senegal during the CAS period. IFC also provided AS support to Ecobank, a big bank in Senegal that is part of one of the largest African financial services groups, through the AMSMETA program to expand its services to MSMEs; however, the average loan size was higher than \$50,000, with loan growth falling short of target by 40 percent and unsustainable NPL ratios. Two initiatives, one for leasing and another targeted at women, were terminated, while the initiative for housing finance did not materialize.

30. **Promoting a modern and diversified agriculture.** Under the CAS, the outcome target of increasing non-traditional exports was met with the assistance of the Agriculture Markets and Agribusiness Development APL (PDMAS, FY06), whereby 26,000 tons of fruits and vegetables were exported in 2010. This project also helped increase irrigated land, although the expansion fell short of the CAS target. However, considerable scale-up is needed to translate the good project level outcomes into a modern and diversified agriculture sector in Senegal. Between 2001 and 2010, the contribution of agriculture to GDP declined from 18.5 to 16.7 percent, while the share of merchandise

exports accounted by agricultural raw exports and food products dropped sharply from 49 percent in 2006 to 30 percent in 2010. Agriculture production remains highly volatile and dependent on the weather. In addition to the PDMAS, IDA provided additional financing for the Food Security Project (FY10) and the Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations 2 APL (FY) to increase smallholder producer's access to sustainable and diversified agricultural services and innovation. An IFC agribusiness investment was cancelled before disbursement.

31. **Promoting sustainable development and management of natural resources.** Managing Senegal's declining fish stocks, reversing the land degradation in some regions and establishing community forest management to meet household wood fuel needs were the key sustainability objectives during the CAS period. In the fishery sector, with support from the Integrated Marine and Resource Management Project (FY05-FY12) the Sustainable Management of Fish Resources Project (FY09-FY12), and the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program APL (FY10), the CAS target of reducing fishing effort on targeted species in specific fishing communities was mostly reached. Good progress was also achieved in establishing sustainable community managed forests, which can now meet 100 percent of household wood fuels needs at the national level (vs. target of 75 percent). An important breakthrough in this area was the issuance of a Government decree eliminating the charcoal quota system. IDA supported these efforts with the Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management II (FY10) to increase the use of diversified household fuels while preserving forest ecosystems, and the PFSC which included the elimination of the charcoal quota system as a prior action. However, the target of expanding sustainably managed land in priority zones was not met as IDA's Sustainable Land Management Project (GEF) became effective only mid-2010. Although project performance was rated *satisfactory* by the latest ISR, concrete results towards having large areas of land sustainably managed in sylvo-pastoral zones and the groundnut basin have yet to materialize. In addition to the lending operations, IDA also delivered the Country Environmental Assessment (FY08), and policy notes.

32. IEG rates the outcome of WBG assistance under Pillar I as *moderately unsatisfactory*. Although all the objectives were and continue to be highly relevant to the achievement of high and sustained economic growth, the massive CAS agenda seemed to have overwhelmed both the Bank and the client, limiting the delivery of results. In investment climate, the overall business environment deteriorated despite regulatory reforms in selected areas. In infrastructure, little progress was made toward removing the road and electricity bottlenecks - the critical reforms of the electricity tariff structure stalled as demand continued to rise faster than supply capacity; while limited road quality improvement is now raising questions on the road maintenance approach adopted. Some progress was made in easing access to credit for SMEs, increasing non-traditional agricultural export at project level, and promoting sustainable fishing and forest exploitation practices in targeted areas; however, considerable scaling-up is required to have an economy-wide impact. No appreciable progress was achieved in reversing land degradation.

Pillar II: Protecting human development / shared growth

33. Under this pillar, IDA supported three objectives that were critical to the achievement of the MDG agenda: (i) improving the quality of and access to basic education; (ii) improving health services provision for women and children; and (iii) improving protection of targeted vulnerable groups.

34. **Improving the quality of and access to basic education.** Access to basic education improved considerably, but the progress may not be enough to meet the corresponding MDGs. The gross primary enrollment rose from 79.9 to 93.9 percent during 2004-12; the gender parity index reached 1.15 in 2012 (from 0.95 in 2005); and primary education completion rates increased from 48.7 percent in 2005 to 66.9 percent in June 2012, which missed the CAS target of 77 percent by 2009 even though it surpassed the project-level target of 65 percent. Other areas of improvement include lower dropout and repetition rates in primary education, and higher transition from primary to middle schools (from 46.3 to 88 percent between 2005 and 2011). No information is available regarding improvements in education quality. IDA supported this objective through the Quality Education for All APL (FY07), which, along with multiple trust funds, financed inputs intended to improve education

quality; and the PRSC IV, which supported policy reforms in the education sector.

35. **Improving health services provision for women and children.** Of the three outcome targets, two (vitamin A supplements for children and households using insecticide treated nets) were met, while the third (percentage of assisted birth) was almost reached at the national level (66.9 percent vs. 70 percent), although there is no data on progress in the 5 poorest regions. At the aggregate level, the health results were mixed: while child mortality (MDG 4) decreased sharply from 121 per 1,000 live births to 72 between 2005 and 2010, maternal and neonatal mortalities declined only slowly from 430 per 100,000 live births to 370 and from 35 deaths per 1,000 births to 29, respectively, during the same period. Children's malnutrition indicators did not improve, but the percentage of stunted children increased from 20 to 29 percent and those underweight from 14 to 19 percent between 2005 and 2009. Senegal has reached the MDG in the area of HIV/AIDS. The worsening health results for women and children could have reflected the impact of the global food crisis and the overall slow-down of the economy, but also suggest a disconnect between the local achievements through Bank interventions and the broader development outcomes. The CAS intended to develop this link through the PRSC and the budgetary allocations. However, the results matrix does not include indicators to measure progress in this regard. Consequently, the issue of sustainability of the project efforts and of scaling-up of local results remains. IDA supported this objective through several operations, including the PRSC IV, the Nutrition Enhancement Program I and II (FY02 and FY07), which directly supported two of the outcome targets, and the Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project (FY09), and the HIV/AIDS and Prevention Control Project (FY02-FY10). IDA also provided a TA on Health Sector Reform (FY11).

36. **Improving protection of targeted vulnerable groups.** As with most targets of the successful Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project, the CAS outcome target for this objective (weight gain for surveyed children) was exceeded. However, this indicator captures only a small subset of the issues related to the protection of vulnerable groups. Poverty incidence, which the CAS aimed to help reduce through targeted assistance to vulnerable groups, remained at around 47 percent throughout the CAS period, compared to the goal of reducing it to 42 percent by 2010. Although moderate reduction of poverty incidence was a notable achievement amid Senegal's economic slow-down and the shocks affecting rural areas where the majority of the poor live, the country is not on track to meet this MDG. In addition to the Rapid Response project mentioned above, the PRSC IV supported the Government's plan to scale up the Programme de Renforcement de la Nutrition (PRN). Specifically, the 2010 Finance Law was to include additional funds for the PRN. No information is given in the CASCR on the status of this measure.

37. IEG rates the outcome of the WBG assistance under Pillar II as *moderately unsatisfactory*. The Bank support has helped broaden access to education and close the gender gap. There is no information on the improvement of education quality. In health and nutrition, results have been positive at IDA project level, but not so at the country level. There is no evidence that the Government is allocating more resources beyond these projects in order to address the maternal and children's health problems sustainably. There is no information on the progress toward improving overall protection of targeted vulnerable groups as IDA interventions focused on child nutrition. The target of reducing the vulnerability of children in urban areas under Pillar III cannot be considered met for lack of evidence.

Pillar III: Maximizing urban / rural synergies

38. Under this pillar, IDA supported the Government's efforts at (i) improving urban mobility and access in and out of Dakar and promoting regional centers; (ii) reducing vulnerability of immigrant and emigrant groups with a focus on street children in Dakar; and (iii) improving quality of life through better management of natural resources and access to water and sanitation.

39. **Improving urban mobility and access in and out of Dakar and promoting regional centers.** The outcome indicator, which measures the reduction in travel time for accessing Dakar, was not monitored. Therefore, although the relevant sections of a new toll road have been constructed, it is unclear whether the new road has led to the desired results. Available information suggests that

within Dakar mobility has worsened with a major increase in vehicles and vehicle traffic, which was not identified *ex ante* as a key issue for improving urban mobility. The IDA projects targets for rehabilitating classrooms, health centers and roads in Casamance were met, although the CAS target was not tracked. No information is available regarding the developmental impact these efforts on the region, or the progress toward promoting regional centers in Senegal. IDA support for the urban mobility objective included the Urban Mobility Improvement Project (FY00-FY09), which sought, without success, to reduce travel times within Dakar; the Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Highway (FY09); and the Transport and Urban Mobility Project (FY10), which is seeking to reduce travel time in selected routes inside the Grandes Niayes area. Regarding regional development, IDA financed the rehabilitation of social infrastructure in conflict-affected Casamance with the Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project (FY05-FY10).

40. **Reducing vulnerability of immigrant and emigrant groups with a focus on street children in Dakar.** There is no information on the CAS target of reducing working children in Dakar by half by the end of 2009, as the indicator was not tracked. The CASCR does not discuss any issues related to immigrant and emigrant groups, including their vulnerability. Moreover the issue of street children should have been part of the broader objective of protecting targeted vulnerable groups under Pillar II. Many IDA operations in education and health sectors, as well as PRSC III and IV, had a focus on improving children’s welfare. PRSC III also specified as a prior action the implementation of a project to fight the worst form of child labor. Several AAA work also focused on the vulnerability of children, including Street Kids (FY07), Bringing Vulnerability into Policy Focus – Vulnerable Youth and Children in Senegal (FY09), and work to track rural dropouts. Overall, there is no evidence of significant progress toward reducing the vulnerability of street children.

41. **Improving quality of life through better management of natural resources and access to water and sanitation.** Although the objective invoked better natural resource management, the focus of the efforts, as reflected in the CAS results matrix, was exclusively on improving access to water and sanitation. The CASCR reports that the outcome targets for improved access to water and sanitation services in rural areas were met (although WDI data show slower progress). IDA support for this objective included the successful Long-term Water Sector Project (FY01-09), which focused on Dakar and secondary cities; the Supporting Access to On-Site Sanitation through Output-Based Aid trust funds (FY08-FY12), which contributed to over 100,000 persons gaining access to sanitation services in the Dakar areas; and the Water and Sanitation Millennium Project (FY09), which aims to increase access to sustainable water and sanitation in selected rural and urban areas. IDA also delivered a Country Environment Assessment in FY08.

42. IEG rates the outcome of WBG assistance under Pillar III as *moderately satisfactory*. There is clear evidence of progress in access to water and sanitation services, and the Bank has contributed to these results. The objectives for the rehabilitation of Casamance have been broadly achieved, but there is no evidence of a more balanced regional development with Bank support. The Bank program did not contribute to reducing congestion in Dakar, which worsened during the CAS period, and data is not collected to measure improvement, if any, in accessing Dakar. The progress toward improving natural resource management is discussed under Pillar I while that toward protecting street children in Dakar is covered under Pillar II.

Objectives	CASCR Rating	IEG Rating
Filter: Mainstreaming governance	<i>Not rated</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
Pillar I: Promoting growth/wealth creation	<i>Not rated</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
Pillar II: Protecting human development/shared growth	<i>Not rated</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
Pillar III: Maximizing urban/rural synergies	<i>Not rated</i>	<i>Moderately satisfactory</i>

4. Overall IEG Assessment		
	CASCR Rating	IEG Rating
Overall Outcome:	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
IBRD/IDA Performance:	<i>Satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately satisfactory</i>
IFC Performance:	<i>Not rated</i>	<i>Moderately satisfactory</i>

Overall outcome:

43. IEG rates the overall outcome of the CAS as *moderately unsatisfactory*, concurring with the CASCR rating. In all four pillars, although some objectives were achieved, a majority of them were only partially achieved; some were not achieved.

44. Under the Governance Filter, some improvement was achieved in the budget process and in the transparency of budget execution, mostly associated with prior actions for IDA adjustment credits, but the overall progress toward improving governance was weak. Under the Growth Pillar, little progress was made toward removing key bottlenecks in the transport and energy sectors, while the overall business environment deteriorated despite encouraging regulatory reforms in some areas. Gains in agricultural diversification at the project level are yet to have a significant impact at the national level as the share of agriculture in exports and GDP declined. Good progress was achieved in managing fishing and forest resources, but little was done to reverse land degradation. Under the Human Development Pillar, good progress was achieved in broadening access to education and closing the gender gap, but there is no indication of improvement in the quality of education. In health and nutrition, there is a large disconnect between the positive results at the project level and the disappointing outcomes at the national level. Similarly, although a child-focused social cash transfer project is achieving good results, there is no information on the welfare of street children in Dakar, a target vulnerable group that the CAS aimed to protect. Finally, under the Urban-Rural Synergy Pillar, there is no evidence of improved access in and out of Dakar and congestion worsened in the city. The rehabilitation of Casamance has broadly achieved the intended outcomes, but there is no information on whether it has led to greater balance in regional development. Good progress was achieved in improving access to water and sanitation services.

IDA Performance:

45. IEG rates IDA performance as *moderately satisfactory*, below the CASCR rating of *satisfactory*. The CASCR rating centers on the rapid and flexible response of the IDA team to emerging challenges. IEG concurs with this aspect. IDA adapted its assistance in response to the successive external and internal shocks and leveraged donor resources in specific emergency operations. IDA managed its portfolio well, and collaborated with other partners to implement the Paris agenda. However, IEG considers that the shortcomings in program design and its results framework undermined IDA's ability to achieve the CAS objectives. Although the CAS program was relevant and well aligned to the country's own development program, its design was diffused and ambitious, overstretching the political and technical capacity of the Government to advance policy reform, as well as the Bank's capacity to deliver given the instruments available. A major issue is the gap between the ambitious CAS objectives and the narrowly-focused outcomes drawn from individual projects. Several specific projects have been successful, but the design of the strategy did not encourage catalytic effects and scale-up beyond the individual operations. A similar issue applies to the PRSC series – it is unclear how they encouraged reallocation of public resources to critical areas such as primary education, health and nutrition, where projects have been successful. As such, the strategy seems to have been more of a project strategy rather than one that sought replicability and transformational changes. There is limited evidence of joint IDA-IFC efforts in implementing the CAS.

IFC Performance:

46. The CASCR does not discuss or rate IFC performance, with the two paragraphs on IFC focusing mainly on the number of investments and their dollar volumes committed, and a description of the AS work undertaken. IEG rates the overall IFC performance as *moderately satisfactory*. The CAS correctly identified a number of activities for IFC engagement, which focused on the objectives under Pillar I: improving investment climate, removing infrastructure bottleneck, expanding the range of and access to financial products, with a focus on SEMs, and promoting export growth. The design envisaged extensive collaboration between IDA, WBI and IFC. However, even though the role of the IFC was largely captured by the results framework, few of the outcome indicators reflected IFC activities. While most of the planned investments materialized and made important contributions to increasing power supply and improving access to credit for MSMEs, much of the ambitious AS program was not implemented. IFC did no specific TA work with WBI on development of the knowledge economy, nor on the regional housing finance market, and nor a review of the fiscal regime of financial operations in Senegal. There was also no TA by the Bank and IFC on the issue of land access that penalizes investors in specific sectors such as agriculture and tourism, nor any TA support in natural resources, the development of skilled labor, and the use of technology.

5. Assessment of CAS Completion Report

47. The CASCR is well prepared. It provides a good description of the challenges and the efforts of the Bank to manage the challenges during CAS implementation. There is adequate information on the results achieved and sufficient analysis to draw lessons. However, the CASCR does not consider the link between the CAS outcomes and the country's development goals that they intended to support. This is largely due to the weakness of the results framework which focused overwhelmingly on project-specific outcome indicators. Indeed, a major shortcoming of the CASCR was the lack of acknowledgment that many outcome indicators, which started as broader measurement of sector progress in the original CAS, became increasingly narrowly-focused to reflect more project level outcomes in the CASPR. The CASCR follows primarily the CASPR results matrix, but switches back to the original CAS indicators from time to time. The CASCR covers the IFC program in two paragraphs, providing some information on projects undertaken. Some discussion of the adjustments to the programs necessitated by the changing external circumstances and the performance of IFC's projects in the portfolio would have been useful. The CASCR could also have highlighted where IDA and IFC collaborated to deliver a coherent WBG program as there is no evidence for a close collaboration despite the intentions.

6. Findings and Lessons

48. The CASCR identifies four lessons: long-term engagement in any given area for lasting development impact; realism in assessing what needs to be done and what can be done; a combination of different instruments in strategic sectors; and attention to the relevance and measurability of outcome indicators. IEG concurs with these and underscores three key points. First, strong commitments and follow-up actions by the Government are critical for a WBG-supported intervention to lead to broader development impact than the intervention itself. During the CAS period, many successful interventions failed to produce the desired higher-level impact due to lack of follow-up. Second, there is a need for stronger synergy between budget support operations and other WBG instruments such as AAA, TA, and investment projects. Several sectoral IDA projects would have had greater impact if better supported by the PRSC series. Third, a coordinated approach between IDA, IFC and MIGA, while relevant, needs significant effort at the working level to build synergies and mutually reinforcing support. The clear intentions of the CAS to maximize WBG synergies were not matched by close collaboration among the three institutions during CAS implementation.

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of the CAS Objectives

Annex Table 2: Senegal Planned and Actual Lending, FY07-12

Annex Table 3: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY07-12 (in US\$ million)

Annex Table 4: Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY07-12

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Senegal, FY07-12

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Senegal and Comparators, FY07-12

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Senegal and Comparators, FY07-12

**Annex Table 8: IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Senegal, FY07-12
(in US\$ million)**

**Annex Table 9: Total Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2006-2010
(in US\$ million)**

Annex Table 10: Economic and Social Indicators for Senegal and Comparators, 2006 – 2011

Annex Table 11: Millennium Development Goals

**Annex Table 12: List of IFC's investments in Senegal that were active during FY07-11
(US\$'000)**

Annex Table 13. List of IFC's Advisory Services in SENEGAL, FY07-11

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of the CAS Objectives

CAS FY07-FY12: The governance filter		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1. Improving efficiency and transparency in the use of public resources.		
	Carry-over (<i>reports de crédit</i>) from previous years equals 5 percent at end FY10 (as a percentage of total current year budget).	PFSC prior action included <i>adoption of decree on the budget-closing schedule that strictly limits carry-overs to no more than 5 percent of current year appropriations</i> . Supplemental Budget adopted for FY 2009 reflecting new carry-over rules. Rule followed for FY2010.	Source: CASCR
	ASTER-based statements available 30 days after the end of the month.	Available within 7 days by end of 2010.	Source: CASCR PFSC prior actions included <i>making the new accounting system (ASTER) functional in all the centralizing accounting stations, as evidenced by the production of a monthly balance of the Treasury on ASTER</i> . Consolidated public accounts started to be prepared for February 2009.
	Reduce delays in submitting annual public accounts to the <i>Cour de Comptes</i> by no more than one year (following the end of fiscal year) at end FY10.	By 2010, the Ministry of Finance had submitted to the Audit Court the draft budget execution law up to 2009 (PRSC V trigger).	Source: CASCR First, PFSC prior actions included <i>Submission of Public accounts prepared for 2006 submitted to the Audit Office</i> (hampered until then by late filing by the Treasury). Thereafter, authorities continued to speed up transmission of budget execution laws and public accounts to Audit office. PRSCIV prior condition included <i>Submission to the Audit Office of the execution laws up to 2008 and submission to the Parliament of the execution laws reviewed by the Audit office from 1999 to 2002</i> .
	2. Increase public sector accountability through decentralization, stronger institutions and better information.		
	Make sure that the longest delay in transferring FECL and FDD not exceed 3 months (from beginning of fiscal year) in FY10.	PRSC III prior actions included <i>Adoption of necessary texts for the rationalization of FDD/FECL transfers to Local Governments</i> . PFSC prior conditions included <i>transfer of budgetary appropriations for FDD/FECL to local communities for FY 09 by the MEF</i> . The yearly act transferring FDD resources has been notified before end of March 2010.	Source: CASCR PDLP and LADP indicators show good progress achieved on the institutional front/ capacity building for local government (municipalities as well as rural communities), but less on transfer of resources (amounts) to local government. Reform of local fiscality still lagging.
	Independent audit of all government procurement transactions to be carried out by ARMP on annual basis for preceding year.	Government had an audit of procurement transactions in 2009 carried out with support of PIPP.	Source: CASCR It uncovered a number of significant irregularities. ARMP cancelled over 20 procurement cases not in abeyance with procurement code.
	Publish monthly budget execution reports (<i>situation d'exécution budgétaire</i>) from SIGFIP on the website of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in less than 60 days by end FY10.	Consolidated public accounts (monthly execution tables) started to be prepared February 2009. They are now available within 30 days in the MEF website.	Source: MEF website and CASCR
	3. Strengthening and modernizing the judicial system and mechanisms for private sector governance.		
	Improve the Doing Business indicator on enforcement of contracts from 485 days in 2005 to less than 300 days (or reduce number of procedures from 33 in 2005 to less than 25 in 2010).	The Doing Business indicator on required days for the enforcement of contracts remained unchanged at 780 days from 2005 to 2013. The Doing Business indicator on required procedures for the enforcement of contracts slightly decreased from 44 in 2005 to 43 in 2013.	Source: CASCR Under the PIPP a sector expenditure program for justice had been prepared and a sector reform program (<i>Programme Sectoriel Justice</i> PSJ) adopted (2004). Activities financed under PIPP included the establishment of a Center for Arbitration, Mediation, and Conciliation, which, as of mid-2008, has arbitrated 26 commercial disputes, including a case of a commercial dispute worth over US\$60 million in contracts.

CAS FY07-FY12: Pillar I Promoting Wealth Creating/Accelerated Growth		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
<u>Major Outcome Measures</u>	1.Promoting a competitive investment climate		
	Reduce by 30 percent the time and cost to register a business and register a property by FY10.	Time to register a business: from 58 in 2006 to 5 in 2013, implying a decrease than more than 30%. Cost (% of income per capita) to register a business: from 108.7% in 2006 to 64.4% in 2013, implying a decrease higher than 30%. Time to register a property: from 145 in 2006 to 122 in 2013, implying a decrease lower than 30%. Cost (% of property value) to register a property: increased from 19.5% in 2006 to 20.2%.	Source: Doing Business
	2.Building and maintaining basic infrastructure for growth		
	Improve the quality of the core road network (paved roads) in <u>targeted areas</u> by increasing the proportion of roads rated bad to fair by 40% and for fair condition to good by 25%.	No data available.	Source: CASCR AGERROUTE data (in the absence of a comprehensive survey of the network since 2006) indicates that between 2005 and 2009 the percentage increased 55% to 61% for paved roads and 60% to 64% gravel roads. But according to new model of rehabilitation and development of road network used in the PER, the results would be lower: or 56% instead of 61% for paved roads and 19% instead of 64% for gravel roads, resulting in an aggregate value of approximately 30% compared with the African average of 70%. 2010 PER suggest that the strategy of road network maintenance implemented during the recent years may not have been the most appropriate.
	New electricity tariff structure prepared by CSRE.	CASCR reports that the outcome has not been achieved	Source: CASCR The financial restructuring of SENELEC was not achieved and its financial situation remains precarious. Its operational performance improved little. The gap between power demand and supply will remain significant until new generation capacity being built or planned (partly with IFC and other donors' support) comes on stream. In the meantime, the population and economy at large are continuing to suffer from power cuts and load shedding.
	Increase number of households with electricity by 30,000 in rural areas by FY10.	No data available yet.	Source: P085708 SN-Elec. Serv. for Rural Areas (FY05) ISR and CASCR Number expected to exceed 16,000 in World Bank project concessions and at least as much in concessions financed by other donors (13,000 with the AfDB concession).
	3.Facilitating access to financial resources by SME's		
Increase number of IDA/IFC partial Credit Guarantees to SMEs by 20-25 percent by 2010.	CASCR reports that the outcome has not been achieved	Source: CASCR Very limited progress partly due to the fact that the PIPP project was suspended for a good part of 2008, due to fiduciary problems. With the restructuring of the project mid 2010 the legal covenant to finance a joint IDA/IFC risk-sharing facility was restated to enable financing the TA and for providing partial guarantee for a portfolio of loans to participating commercial banks	

CAS FY07-FY12: Pillar I Promoting Wealth Creating/Accelerated Growth		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
			meeting criteria of Risk-sharing Framework Agreement. New arrangements to work with matching grants for TA. Outcome indicators reformulated to 25 guarantees by end of PIPP project.
4.Promoting a modern and diversified agriculture			
Increase volume of non-traditional exports from 18,000 tons in 2005 to 25,000 tons by FY10.	No data on non-traditional exports.		Source: CASCR 24,000 tons of fruits/vegetables were exported in 2009; and the estimate for 2010 was 26,400 tons.
Develop 2,500 hectares of irrigated land.	CASCR reports that the outcome has not been achieved		Source: CASCR But second related PDMAS outcome – 2500 ha under irrigation/improved - partly achieved: 1544 ha expected by end 2009.
5.Promoting sustainable development and management of natural resources			
Reducing the level of fishing effort on targeted species in 12 central coastal fishing communities.	The fishing effort has been reduced on targeted species in 4 central coastal fishing communities as a result of the GIRMaC (Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project FY12.)		Source: CASCR The fishing effort is on track to be reduced in 8 more communities through the GDRH (Sustainable Management of Fish Resources FY09) .These 8 communities are currently preparing their co-management initiatives, which will reduce the fishing effort on targeted species.
Manage 100,000 ha of land sustainably in priority areas (i.e. sylvo-pastoral zones and the groundnut basin).	CASCR reports that the outcome indicator has not been achieved.		Source: CASCR SLM GEF became only effective mid 2010 and implementation barely starting.
Meet 3 over 4 household wood fuels needs at the national level through the establishment of sustainable community managed forests.	267,000 hectares of sustainable community managed forests have been established between 2005 and 2007. These areas can meet 100 percent of needs at national level.		Source: CASCR

CAS FY07-FY12: Pillar II Human Development/Shared growth		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1. Improving quality of and access to basic education		
	Increase success rate in achieving primary level from 53.1% in 2005 to 77.0% in 2009 (and from 51.5% to 73.0% for girls).	The primary completion rate increased from 50.7% in 2006 to 59.2% in 2010 (latest data available). The primary completion rate for females increased from 48.7% in 2006 to 60.6% in 2010 (latest data available).	Source: WDI
	2. Improving health services provision for women and children		
	Increase the number of assisted births to 70% at national level while assuring a minimum of 50% in the 5 poorest regions.	The Government's PRSP 2010 diagnosis progress report indicates that proportion increased from 59.0% in 2006 to 66.9% in 2009. No data available for the 5 poorest regions.	Source: CASCR
	At least 80% of children aged 6-59 months in the intervention areas receive high preventive doses of vitamin A supplements twice yearly.	From 79% in Nov 2006 to 94% in June 2012.	Source: P097181 Nutrition Enhancement Program II (FY07) ISR.
	50% of targeted households use insecticide treated nets (ITN) by 2009.	70% in the targeted households in the Nutrition project.	Source: P097181 Nutrition Enhancement Program II (FY07) ISR and CASCR
	3. Improving protection of targeted vulnerable groups		
75% of surveyed children between 0-24 months showing adequate weight gain.	From 50% in Nov 2006 to 81% in June 2012.	Source: P097181 Nutrition Enhancement Program II (FY07) ISR	

CAS FY07-FY12: Pillar III Urban /rural synergies		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1.Improving urban mobility and access in and out Dakar and promote regional centers		
	Reduce the travel time between Dakar (Malik Sy) and Pikine to 20 minutes on the Toll Road.	CASCR reports that the outcome indicator is not yet measured.	Source: CASCR Not yet measured but with first 2 sections completed (Malick Sy-Patte d'Oie and Patte d'Oie Pikine - 12.6 km) it is likely it is achieved
	Rehabilitate 2/3 of social infrastructure (health centers, classrooms, roads) affected by the conflict in Casamance.	CASCR reports that the outcome indicator has not been measured.	Source: CASCR Intermediate outcome essentially achieved by 2009: 141 classrooms, 25 health centers and 26 maternity clinics were rehabilitated. In addition 251 km (10% total network) connecting about 90 towns, 8 bridges and 6 pontoon bridges were rehabilitated
	2.Reducing the vulnerability of immigrant and emigrant groups, and especially of street children in Dakar		
	Reduce by half the proportion of working children in Dakar by en 2009.	CASCR reports that the outcome indicator has not been measured.	Source: CASCR Government PRSP 2 ICDR diagnosis report indicates 22,377 children withdrawn from work during 2007- 2008. But it acknowledges that performance of the protection of vulnerable groups pillar has been weak.
3.Improving the quality of life through better management of natural resources and access to water and sanitation			
Increase access to rural areas to (i) water from 65% in 2005 to 70% in 2009; and to (ii) sanitation from 19%in 2005 to 28% in 2009.	Access to water in rural areas: from 53% in 2006 to 56% in 2010 (latest data available). Access to sanitation in rural areas: from 35% in 2006 to 39% in 2010 (latest data available).	Source: WDI	

Annex Table 2. Planned and Actual Lending, FY07-FY12

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome rating
Planned (CAS FY07-10)						
P098964	PRSC III	2007	2007	20.0	20.0	IEG:MS
P097181	Nutrition Enhancement Program II	2007	2007	15.0	15.0	LIR: HS
P089254	Quality Education for All Project - Phase 2	2007	2007	30.0	30.0	LIR:S
P084022	Local Authorities Development Program	2007	2007	80.0	80.0	LIR:MS
P094917	Regional WAPP	2007	2007	5.0	15.0	LIR:S
P105279	Senegal Energy Sector Recovery Development Policy Financing	2008	2008	50.0	80.0	IEG:U
P087304	Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway	2008	2009	50.0	105.0	LIR:MS
P117273	Poverty Reduction Support Credit 4	2009	2010	60.0	43.0	NA
P120629	Second Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management	2009	2010		15.0	LIR:S
	MTNSN/GM Integration Project	2009	Dropped			
P105881	Sustainable Management of Fish Resources	2009	2009	3.5	3.5	LIR:U
	Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and					
P115938	Nutrition Security Project	2009	2009	10.0	10.0	LIR:HS
P113801	SN - Economic Governance Project	2009	2010	10.0	8.0	LIR:MS
P114935	Add Financing Felou Hydroelectric (Regional)	2010	2010	12.0	25.0	LIR:S
P101415	Transport & Urban Mobility Project	2010	2010	50.0	55.0	LIR:S
P121178	Poverty Reduction Support Credit 5	2010	2011	30.0	42.0	LIR:S
P109986	Water and Sanitation Millennium Project	2010	2010	60.0	55.0	LIR:S
P116301	Additional financing for food security (GFRP)	2010	2010	10	10.0	NA
	Electricity for Rural Areas I1	2010	Dropped	30.0		
	Regional Bio-safety Project	2010	Dropped			
	Senegal River Multimodal Navigation	2010	Dropped			
	Regional Fisheries	2010		5.0	15.0	
	Add Financing PDMAS (Food Crisis)	2010		10.0	10.0	
Total planned projects CAS FY07-10				540.5	626.5	
Non planned						
P108583	3A W/C Africa Air Transport Phase II-B		2009		2.3	LIR:MS
P105881	Sustainable Management of Fish Resources		2009		3.5	LIR:U
P107288	SN- DPO-Public Financial Support Credit		2009		60.0	IEG:S
Total non-planned projects for the period FY07-10					65.8	
Total projects CAS FY07-10					692.3	
P123673	Senegal Tertiary Education Governance and Financing For Results		2011		101.3	LIR:S
P122476	Public Financial Management Strengthening Technical Assistance Project		2011		15.0	LIR:S
P129398	Additional Financing Nutrition Enhancement Project (PRN2)		2012		10.0	LIR: HS
P122841	Stormwater Mgt. and Climate Change Adaptation Project		2012		55.6	NA
Total projects FY11-12					181.9	
Total projects FY07-12					874.2	
Ongoing projects						
Project ID	Project name		Approval FY	Closed FY	Approved Amount	Outcome rating
P002366	Second Transport Sector Project		1999	2008	90	IEG:S
P055472	Urban Mobility Improvement Project		2000	2009	70	IEG:MU
P041528	Long Term Water Sector Project		2001	2009	125	IEG: S
P074059	HIV/AIDS Prevention & Control Project		2002	2010	30	IEG:MS
P070541	Nutrition Enhancement Program		2002	2007	15	IEG: S
P051609	Private Investment Promotion Project		2003	2012	46	LIR:MU
P080013	Private Sector Adjustment Credit		2004	2009	45	IEG: U
P069207	Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project - CERSP		2005	2010	20	IEG:MS
P086480	Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project		2005	2012	10	LIR:MS
P085708	SN-Elec. Serv. for Rural Areas (FY05)		2005	Active	30	LIR:MS
P073477	SN - Electricity Sector Efficiency Enhancement - Phase 1, APL-1		2005	2011	16	LIR:U
P088656	SN-Participatory Local Development Program		2006	2012	50	LIR:S
P093622	Agricultural Services & Producer Organizations Project 2		2006	2011	20	LIR:MS
P083609	Agricultural Markets and Agribusiness Development Project		2006	Active	35	LIR:S
P091051	SN-PRSC 2		2006	2007	30	IEG: MS
Total ongoing projects					631	

Source: Senegal FY07-10 CAS/CASPR and WB Business Warehouse Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 11/28/2012.

LIR: Latest internal rating. U: Unsatisfactory. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory

Annex Table 3. Trust Funds, FY07-FY12 (in US\$ million)

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approved Amount	Approval FY	Closing FY
P112627	Senegal PFM Reform Support Program	TF 53018	3.42	2004	2010
P070530	SN-GEF Elec Srvs for Rural Areas (FY05)	TF 53937	5.00	2005	Active
P058367	Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project	TF 54531	5.00	2005	2012
P093175	SENEGAL - Supreme Audit Institution	TF 54288	0.29	2005	2008
P070530	SN-GEF Elec Srvs for Rural Areas (FY05)	TF 53115	0.49	2005	Active
P041566	Social Development Fund Project	TF 54216	1.97	2005	2009
P093622	Agricultural Services & Producer Organizations Project 2	TF 55151	0.99	2006	2007
P096232	GDLN Program Monitoring and Evaluation System	TF 56173	0.43	2006	2010
P041528	SN-Long Term Water Sec SIL (FY01)	TF 54215	0.73	2006	2009
P099681	CA: Senegal National Cities Without Slum	TF 57224	0.43	2007	2011
P083609	Agricultural Markets and Agribusiness Development Project	TF 58319	14.10	2007	Active
P103291	Support to the Accountancy Profession	TF 57346	0.27	2007	2010
P108191	From Harmful Aquatic Plants to New Cooking Fuel	TF 57209	0.10	2007	2008
P092062	Sustainable Management of Fish Resources	TF 90576	0.26	2008	2009
P102478	Senegal Sanitation- Supporting Access to on-site sanitation services through OBA scheme in Senegal	TF 90467	2.88	2008	2012
P102478	Senegal Sanitation- Supporting Access to on-site sanitation services through OBA scheme in Senegal	TF 90466	2.88	2008	2012
P086480	Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project	TF 90534	0.53	2008	2011
P092062	Sustainable Management of Fish Resources	TF 93654	6.00	2009	2012
P115938	Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project	TF 94372	8.00	2009	2013
P106862	TTR IS Fund Phase 2	TF 94175	0.01	2009	2010
P110948	Senegal Employment Capacity Building IDF	TF 92636	0.45	2009	2012
P107167	SN-Rural Lighting Efficiency (FY08)	TF 92714	1.80	2009	Active
P108144	Sustainable Land Management Project	TF 94263	4.80	2010	2012
P114573	Senegal Nutrition: Strengthening Operational Evaluation in Program implementation	TF 95495	0.49	2010	Active
P116783	Senegal EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund	TF 94753	81.50	2010	Active
P128137	Senegal Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation Project	TF 10853	1.10	2012	Active
P126752	Senegal Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building	TF 10238	0.40	2012	Active
P124538	Senegal Min Sector Diagnostic & Cap Bldg	TF 99837	0.48	2012	Active
P089254	Quality Education for All Project - Phase 2	TF 99819	1.02	2012	2012
		TF 96421	1.52	2011	Active
		TF 91830	1.71	2008	2013
		TF 56897	4.00	2007	2012
Total FY07-12			144.8		

Source: Senegal FY 07-May2012 CPS/CSPSR and WB Business Warehouse Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 03/06/2012.

Annex Table 4. Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY07-12

Project ID	Economic and Sector Work	Proposed FY	Delivered to Client FY	Output Type
	<i>Planned (CAS FY07-12)</i>			
P093564	Senegal Country ROSC Assessment	2007	2006	Report
	Support ESSD TF (Sustainable Devt. Sector Dialogue)	2007	Dropped	
P078157	Senegal - Strategic Country Gender Assessment	2007	2006	Report
P098120	Senegal Country Environment Assessment	2007	2008	Report
P102228	Country Economic Memorandum	2007	2008	Report
	PER (civil service reform)	2008		
P102244	Senegal Investment Climate Assessment	2008	2009	Report
P107293	Poverty Assessment	2009	2008	Report
	Full PER	2009	2012	Report
	AGS mid-term assessment	2010	Dropped	
	PEFA update	2010	Dropped	
	Access to Finance	2010	Dropped	
	Policy Notes	2010	Dropped	
	<i>Non-planned</i>			
P102294	Managing risks in rural Senegal- Rural Livelihoods in the Groundnut Basin I:		2009	Report
	Dakar Bus Financing		2009	Report
	Rural Non-Farm Employment		2009	Report
P102612	Bringing Vulnerability into Policy Focus -Vulnerable Youth and Children in Senegal		2009	Report
P118457	DeMPA Assessment - Senegal		2010	Report
	Climate change and the changing role of children in household risk management strategies		2011	Report
P125270	MTDS Senegal		2011	Report
P107289	SN-First Programmatic Public Finance Review		2011	Report
AAA ID	Technical Assistance	Proposed FY	Delivered to Client FY	Output Type
	<i>Planned (CAS FY07-12)</i>			
P102350	PEFA	2007	2008	"How-To" Guidance
P102248	Street Kids	2007	2007	"How-To" Guidance
P107490	Senegal Employment Strategy TA	2008	2009	Institutional Development Plan
P107480	Health Sector Reform	2010	2011	"How-To" Guidance
	<i>Non-planned</i>			
P112222	Senegal: Outreach activity on Good Governance		2008	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P112276	Spatial Analysis of Natural Hazards		2009	"How-To" Guidance
P119775	Post Disaster Need Assessment		2010	Client Document Review

Source: Senegal CAS and WB Business Warehouse Tables 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 11/21/2012

Annex Table 5. IEG Project Ratings for Senegal, FY07-12

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project Name	Total Evaluated (US\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to Development Outcome *
2007	P070541	SN-Nutrition Enhancement Prgm (FY02)	16.5	Satisfactory	Moderate
2007	P091051	SN-PRSC 2 (FY06)	30.8	Moderately Satisfactory	Significant
2008	P002366	SN-Transp SIL 2 (FY99)	87.0	Satisfactory	Moderate
2008	P098964	SN-PRSC III DPL (FY07)	20.7	Moderately Satisfactory	Significant
2009	P041528	SN-Long Term Water Sec SIL (FY01)	146.1	Satisfactory	Moderate
2009	P055472	SN-Urb Mobility Improvement APL (FY00)	74.2	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Significant
2009	P080013	SN-Priv Sec Adj Crdt (FY04)	24.8	Unsatisfactory	Significant
2010	P069207	SN-Casamance Emerg Reconstr Supt (FY05)	18.8	Moderately Satisfactory	Significant
2010	P074059	SN-HIV/AIDS Prevent & Control APL (FY02)	35.3	Moderately Satisfactory	Negligible to Low
2010	P107288	SN-DPO fast-track-Public Fin. Support Cr	63.0	Satisfactory	Significant
2011	P105279	SN-En. Sec. Recov. Dev Policy Financing	54.4	Unsatisfactory	High

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of as of 11/28/2012.

* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Senegal and Comparators, FY07-12

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower (\$) *	RDO % Moderate or Lower (No) *
Senegal	571.5	11	73.2	72.7	49.9	36.4
AFR	14,249.3	270	73.4	65.3	41.2	41.8
World	81,117.6	1,101	83.0	73.1	68.6	57.8

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of as of November 2012.

* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 7. Portfolio Status for Senegal and Comparators, FY07-12

Fiscal year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
World						
# Proj	1,485	1,525	1,552	1,590	1,595	1,500
# Proj At Risk	243	276	344	366	337	333
% At Risk	16.4	18.1	22.2	23.0	21.1	22.2
Net Comm Amt	100,357.1	106,761.7	131,076.4	158,287.4	168,248.7	168,407.7
Comm At Risk	15,354.3	18,428.2	19,929.9	28,186.1	22,978.5	23,723.1
% Commit at Risk	15.3	17.3	15.2	17.8	13.7	14.1
Africa						
# Proj	393	419	440	454	470	452
# Proj At Risk	83	94	131	137	117	108
% At Risk	21.1	22.4	29.8	30.2	24.9	23.9
Net Comm Amt	21,093.2	23,306.8	28,177.8	34,188.5	37,466.4	38,962.9
Comm At Risk	3,926.1	5,890.2	6,950.5	9,494.2	7,949.7	6,299.8
% Commit at Risk	18.6	25.3	24.7	27.8	21.2	16.2
Senegal						
# Proj	17	16	17	20	19	14
# Proj At Risk	4	4	0	4	3	1
% At Risk	23.5	25.0	0.0	20.0	15.8	7.1
Net Comm Amt	741.7	711.7	656.2	737.0	736.6	609.6
Comm At Risk	166.0	176.0	0.0	151.2	95.4	34.9
% Commit at Risk	22.4	24.7	0.0	20.5	13.0	5.7

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 3a.4 as of November 2012.

Annex Table 8. IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Senegal (in US\$)

FY	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
2007	155,289,518.11	254,595.93	155,034,922.18	3,443,343.68	613,488.80	150,978,089.70
2008	100,671,750.74	989,419.39	99,682,331.35	2,156,169.18	3,354,289.14	94,171,873.03
2009	116,473,817.52	1,276,861.88	115,196,955.64	0.00	5,633,189.53	109,563,766.11
2010	139,529,260.29	3,273,542.24	136,255,718.05	0.00	6,280,714.95	129,975,003.10
2011	173,718,866.93	5,530,004.41	168,188,862.52	0.00	7,559,728.86	160,629,133.66
2012	137,192,439.68	8,955,305.52	128,237,134.16	0.00	8,593,424.26	119,643,709.90
Total (2007-2012)	822,875,653.27	20,279,729.37	802,595,923.90	5,599,512.86	32,034,835.54	764,961,575.50

Source: WB Loan Kiosk, Net Disbursement and Charges Report as of November 2012.

Annex Table 9. Total Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2006-2011

Development Partners	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2006-2011
<i>Bilaterals</i>							
Australia	..	0.06	..	0.16	0.43	..	0.65
Austria	3.77	2.94	3.21	3.26	0.93	1.16	15.27
Belgium	22.8	22.75	20.91	19.3	17.74	..	103.5
Canada	17.08	47.91	73.31	54.49	56.71	..	249.5
Denmark	0.91	0.26	0.28	-5.15	0.24	..	-3.46
Finland	0.65	0.32	0.47	0.52	0.99	..	2.95
France	287.47	176.66	189.03	140.88	157.23	..	951.27
Germany	34.84	27.14	27.78	22.16	23.06	..	134.98
Greece	0.04	0.01	0.29	0.18	..	0.01	0.53
Ireland	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.22	0.07	..	1.07
Italy	1.75	6.26	8.62	19.08	7.19	..	42.9
Japan	34.49	31.95	25.13	46.74	55.21	..	193.52
Korea	0.85	2.43	10.25	5.92	14.85	..	34.3
Luxembourg	14.63	15.65	21.84	22.89	18.84	..	93.85
Netherlands	19.5	22.38	37.9	45.69	29.98	26.88	182.33
Norway	0.59	0.66	0.51	0.49	0.3	..	2.55
Portugal	0.09	0.15	0.15	0.11	0.26	0.38	1.14
Spain	18.12	41.56	59.12	59.26	45.57	..	223.63
Sweden	0.62	0.19	0.29	1.37	0.43	..	2.9
Switzerland	3.68	2.85	2.45	2.6	1.98	..	13.56
United Kingdom	10.1	11.53	0.97	6.52	0.93	..	30.05
United States	37.72	39.24	71.63	67.67	101.42	..	317.68
<i>DAC Countries, Total</i>	509.96	453.15	554.41	514.36	534.36	28.43	2594.67
Czech Republic	0.03	0.07	0.38	0.22	0.02	0.02	0.74
Israel	0.07	0.05	0.16	0.09	0.13	0.2	0.7
Kuwait (KFAED)	10.56	27.2	35.93	3.61	17.41	6.17	100.88
Poland	0.16	0.29	0.15	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.72
Romania	0.01	0.06	0.07
Slovenia	0.06	0.06
Thailand	0.08	0.07	0.16	0.16	0.1	0.07	0.64
Turkey	0.02	0.93	1.36	1.6	2.01	1.91	7.83
United Arab Emirates	0.36	0.97	4.3	-1.14	-5.84	0.02	-1.33
<i>Non-DAC Countries, Total</i>	11.28	29.58	42.5	4.57	13.86	8.52	110.31
<i>Multilaterals</i>							
AfDB	6.47	6.47
AfDF	89.48	56.23	85.96	40.4	63.57	..	335.64
BADEA	4.63	7.05	2.74	6.41	8.25	..	29.08
EU Institutions	33.71	95.25	141.19	134.45	84.05	..	488.65
GAVI	..	7.26	5.78	4.19	4.98	4.36	26.57
GEF	..	7.65	7.7	3.23	6.1	..	24.68
Global Fund	13.52	7.87	12.42	23.52	18.58	23.08	98.99
IAEA	0.47	0.66	0.33	0.44	0.79	0.42	3.11
IDA	125.07	132.7	133.48	134.33	110.44	..	636.02
IFAD	7.93	5.56	4.88	2.51	3.29	..	24.17
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	20.39	..	38.35	99.8	48.84	-3.28	204.1
Isl.Dev Bank	14.46	23.67	15.62	30.04	14.65	..	98.44
Nordic Dev.Fund	5.98	7.39	1.97	3.03	1.49	1.06	20.92
OFID	3.06	12.99	1.38	-1.93	-2.55	..	12.95
UNAIDS	1.1	2.8	0.04	0.2	0.22	..	4.36
UNDP	4.32	5.69	2.87	5.32	4.58	..	22.78
UNFPA	3.1	1.64	2.07	1.41	2.08	2.63	12.93
UNHCR	0.26	0.7	2.97	2.62	2.9	..	9.45
UNICEF	3.99	4.78	5.36	6.29	6.11	6.97	33.5
UNTA	1.98	2.48	1.34	5.8
WFP	3.88	4.62	5.15	1.04	1.09	2.66	18.44
WHO	1.39	1.39
<i>Multilateral Agencies, Total</i>	343.8	386.99	471.6	497.3	379.46	39.29	2118.44
All Development Partners Total	865.04	869.72	1068.51	1016.23	927.68	76.24	4823.42

Source: OECD DAC Online database, Table 2a. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements, as of 11/30/2012.

Annex Table 10. Economic and Social Indicators for Senegal and Comparators, 2006 - 2011

Series Name	Senegal						Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	World
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average 2006-2011		
Growth and Inflation									
GDP growth (annual %)	2.5	4.9	3.7	2.1	4.1	2.6	3.3	4.9	2.3
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	-0.2	2.1	1.0	-0.6	1.4	-0.1	0.6	2.3	1.2
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	1,710.0	1,800.0	1,870.0	1,850.0	1,910.0	1,960.0	1,850.0	2,042.4	10,567.0
GNI, Atlas method (current US mil. \$)	9,325.5	10,367.2	12,045.4	12,961.7	13,451.5	13,716.4	11,978.0	908,052.7	58,332,470.3
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	2.1	5.9	5.8	-1.1	1.3	3.4	2.9	6.9	5.0
Composition of GDP (%)									
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	14.8	13.4	15.6	17.2	17.4	17.8	16.0	13.4	2.8
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	23.0	23.6	22.2	21.7	22.4	23.7	22.8	31.1	26.8
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	62.2	63.0	62.3	61.0	60.2	58.4	61.2	55.6	70.4
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	28.2	30.9	30.2	27.9	29.0	30.7	29.5	20.7	20.8
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	10.7	8.6	3.9	9.3	10.8	11.8	9.2	16.3	21.0
External Accounts									
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	25.6	25.4	26.1	24.4	24.8	25.3	25.3	32.9	28.0
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	43.0	47.7	52.4	43.0	43.0	44.2	45.6	35.7	28.2
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-9.2	-11.6	-14.1	-6.8	-10.4
External debt (% of GDP)	20.5	22.7	21.4	27.4	28.5	..	24.1
Total debt service (% of GNI)	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.6	2.4	..	1.8	1.9	..
Total reserves in months of imports	3.8	3.5	2.6	4.5	3.6	6.7	12.6
Fiscal Accounts ^{1/}									
Central government revenue (% of GDP)	21.4	23.6	22.8	23.5	23.9	24.4
Central government expenditure (% of GDP)	27.5	27.6	27.8	29	29.5	31.6
Central government balance (% of GDP)	-5.8	-3.7	-5	-5.4	-5.7	-7.2
Net Public Debt (% of GDP)	22.1	24.5	24.6	32	33.6	32.7
Social Indicators									
Health									
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	57.7	58.0	58.3	58.6	59.0	59.3	58.5	53.2	69.1
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	89.0	94.0	88.0	86.0	70.0	..	85.4	71.9	83.1
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	49.0	50.0	50.0	51.0	52.0	..	50.4	30.1	61.5
Improved water source (% of population with access)	69.0	70.0	70.0	71.0	72.0	..	70.4	60.1	87.4
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	54.5	52.7	50.9	49.3	48.0	46.7	50.4	74.5	39.9
Population									
Population, total (in million)	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.1	12.4	12.8	12.0	823.7	6,776.7
Population growth (annual %)	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.5	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	41.3	41.6	41.8	42.0	42.3	42.6	41.9	35.4	50.8
Education									
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	9.5	9.6	10.9	11.6	13.2	..	11.0	17.0	44.9
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	82.7	86.5	87.0	86.8	86.8	..	86.0	98.5	106.0
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	25.2	28.6	31.4	..	37.4	..	30.7	35.9	68.2

^{1/} IMF. Senegal Article IV Consultations.

Source: WB World Development Indicators as of November 2012 for all indicators excluding Fiscal Accounts data.

Annex Table 11. Senegal - Millennium Development Goals

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger					
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%)	68	68	68	69	69
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, total (%)	59	58	58	58	57
GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP \$)	3,301	3,163	3,324	3,576	3,610
Income share held by lowest 20%	4	6	7	6	..
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)	19	20	20	15	19
Poverty gap at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (%)	34	19	14	11	..
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)	66	54	44	34	..
Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment)	83	..	78
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education					
Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24)	28	..	41	45	56
Literacy rate, youth male (% of males ages 15-24)	49	..	58	58	74
Persistence to last grade of primary, total (% of cohort)	69	49	63	53	60
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	43	42	40	54	59
Total enrollment, primary (% net)	46	52	60	76	78
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women					
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	13	12	12	19	23
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (%)	73	76	87	97	106
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%)	51	61	65	75	88
Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%)	46	60
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment)	10.6
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality					
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	51	80	48	74	60
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	69	71	67	57	48
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	136	142	130	97	69
Goal 5: Improve maternal health					
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	..	112	110	107	96
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	..	47	58	52	..
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	..	13	11	12	..
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	670	590	500	430	370
Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)	..	82	79	87	..
Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49)	..	35	..	32	..
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases					
Children with fever receiving antimalarial drugs (% of children under age 5 with fever)	36	27	9
Condom use, population ages 15-24, female (% of females ages 15-24)	5	..
Condom use, population ages 15-24, male (% of males ages 15-24)	48	..
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	195	215	237	261	288
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	0.7
Prevalence of HIV, male (% ages 15-24)	0.3
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9
Tuberculosis case detection rate (% , all forms)	35	42	38	34	31
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability					
CO2 emissions (kg per PPP \$ of GDP)	0	0	0	0	0
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0	0	0	1	0
Forest area (% of land area)	48.6	..	46.2	45.0	44.0
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	38	41	45	49	52
Improved water source (% of population with access)	61	63	66	68	72
Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters)	6	6	6	12	12
Net ODA received per capita (current US\$)	112	78	45	64	75
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development					
Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports, excluding workers' remittances)	18	16	13	7	3
Internet users (per 100 people)	0.0	0.0	0.4	4.8	16.0
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	0	0	3	16	67
Telephone lines (per 100 people)	1	1	2	2	3
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	7	6	6	5	5
Other					
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	740	580	530	800	1,080
GNI, Atlas method (current US\$) (billions)	5.3	4.9	5.0	8.7	13.5
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	9.1	13.6	20.5	29.6	29.0
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	53	54	56	57	59
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	27	..	39	42	50
Population, total (billions)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Trade (% of GDP)	57.6	68.2	65.1	69.4	67.8

Source: World Development Indicators database as of November 2012

Annex Table 12. List of IFC's investments in Senegal that were active during FY07-11 (US\$'000)

Project ID	Project Short Name	Cmt. FY	Closure FY	Project Status	IFC Sector Primary	IFC Sector Explntry	Project Size	Net Loans	Net Equity	Total Net Commitment
Investments approved pre-FY07, but active during FY07-11										
500	BHS-Banque Habit	1980		Active	Financial Markets	Housing Finance.	460	--	424.25	424.25
7175	AEF SERT	1996		Active	MAS	Food & Beverage	3,800	715.60	395.06	1,110.66
7821	GTI Dakar	1998		Active	Infrastructure	Electric Power	71,854	12,871.69	1,769.76	14,641.45
8086	AEF SERT Eq Increase	1997	2008	Closed	MAS	Food & Beverage	50	--	45.13	45.13
9141	GTI Dakar Increase	1998		Active	Infrastructure	Electric Power	22,500.42	1,201.31	--	1,201.31
10034	SEF Royal Saly	2002	2008	Closed	MAS	Tourism	3,211	967.86	--	967.86
22410	Kounoune IPP	2007		Active	Infrastructure	Electric Power	81,568.	18,299.05	--	18,299.05
Subtotal							183,443.42	34,055.51	2,634.20	36,689.71
Project ID	Project Short Name	Cmt. FY	Closure FY	Project Status	IFC Sector Primary	IFC Sector Explntry	Project Size	Net Loans	Net Equity	Total Net Commitment
Investments approved in FY07-11										
25363	Vicat-SOCOCIM	2007	2011	Closed	MAS	Cement	25,131	26,321	--	26,321
25970	SEPAM	2007	2009	Closed	MAS	Agribusiness	8,827.57	--	--	--
26071	Teylium Hotel	2008		Active	MAS	Tourism	59,500	10,527.30		10,527.30
26565	MC Senegal	2010		Active	Financial Markets	Micro-Finance	6,400	4,530.63	1,316.76	5,847.39
27102	St. Louis Finances	2010		Active	Financial Markets	Micro-Finance	472.12	--	472.12	472.12
27515	GTFP Ecobank	2009		Active	Financial Markets	Trade Finance	4,000	17,392.53	--	17,392.53
27790	COMASEL St Louis	2010		Active	Infrastructure	Electric Power	750	--	750	750
29008	SENAC	2011		Active	Infrastructure	Highway	336,157.31	30,531.38	--	30,531.38
29930	GRIMAS SN	2010		Active	MAS	Food & Beverage	1,475.10	1,489.32	--	1,489.32
30094	Comasel Louga	2011		Active	Infrastructure	Electric Power	800	--	800	800
Subtotal							443,513.10	90,792.16	3,338.88	94,131.04
Grand Total							626,956.52	124,847.67	5,973.08	130,820.75

Source: IFC, November 2012. The list does not cover the regional projects.
MAS: Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Services;

Annex Table 13. List of IFC's Advisory Services in SENEGAL, FY07-11

Project ID	Start FY	End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
Advisory Services operations approved pre-FY07, but active during FY07-11					
29803	unknown	unknown	Closed	PPP	unknown
522760	2006	2008	Closed	PPP	256,000
539566	2006	2008	Closed	Investment Climate	100,000
539567	2006	2008		Investment Climate	100,000
Subtotal:					456,000
Advisory Services operations approved in FY07-11					
538623	2007	2007	Closed	Access to Finance	--
548265	2007	2010	Closed	SBA	115,440
558205	2007	2009	Closed	PPP (Infra. Adv.)	18,200
563727	2008	2011	Closed	SBA	307,000
565010	2009	2011	Closed	Access to Finance	827,062
567309	2010	2011	Closed	Access to Finance	1,014,000
571287	2010	2011	Closed	SBA	488,000
553405	2011		Active	Access to Finance	1,000,000
581307	2011		Active	Climate Business	--
Subtotal:					3,769,702
Grand Total					4,225,702

Source: Source: IFC, November 2012

SBA: Sustainable Business Advisory