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**Guiding Universities:
Governance and Management Arrangements around the Globe**

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Introduction

1. Universities are led by governing boards and senior managers. How these are organized, the responsibilities they are given, and the procedures for choosing those appointed to these positions are viewed by many observers as key variables that effect institutional performance (Salmi 2009: 26-31; Aghion and colleagues 2009: 3; Fielden 2008; Stensaker and others 2007; Kearney and Huisman 2007). As a result, higher education policymakers and stakeholders seek to understand the range of options available to them for improving university performance through adjustments to governance and management, and what lessons of experience might guide them in making these choices.

2. The analysis that follows offers a preliminary mapping of worldwide trends in university governance with special attention to the roles of governing boards and senior management teams. It is based on a survey of available literature, information from institutional websites, an emailed questionnaire to private universities, and a review of higher education laws, university acts, statutes and bylaws in English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese for 74 countries and 132 universities (see Attachment 1).¹

3. Discussion begins by summarizing the history of university autonomy in the context of its evolving relations with the state, and then offers an overview of global trends in university autonomy and accountability. Next it reviews the key characteristics and considerations that seem to influence the effectiveness of governing board performance. The analysis then proceeds to trace prevailing trends and notable innovations for these indicators across the major geographical regions. It subsequently turns to features that appear to condition the effectiveness of senior management teams. Similarly, it charts their profiles from one region to another and points up significant innovations. The paper then concludes with an overview of the trends observed.

4. This study must be viewed as a preliminary exploration that does not pretend to be exhaustive.² Considerable difficulty was encountered in finding original documentation of the legal frameworks that guide a number of universities. Consequently, in many cases the information obtained comes from secondary sources or abbreviated summaries of governance practices presented on institutional websites.

The Inheritance

5. For most of the 200 year history of modern Humboldtian higher education, university arrangements for governance and management remained largely unchanged. The dominant model was characterized as a “republic of scholars” in which academic

¹ It should be noted that there was no way of ascertaining whether the documentation obtained was that which is currently applicable, or whether it had been superseded or amended by more recent legal actions.

² In addition, this study makes no attempt to compare the legally stipulated structures, allocation of responsibilities, and procedures contained in national higher education legislation with how these are actually interpreted and implemented on a daily basis. Although considerable divergence between what is intended in legal mandates and what actually happens in practice has been observed in numerous higher education systems, exploration of this discrepancy falls beyond the scope of the current review.

freedom and the pursuit of knowledge were the overriding values. Institutional decision-making was collegial, consensus-based, and decentralized within a multitude of departmental, faculty, and institutional committees. The institutional leader – variously titled president, rector or vice-chancellor – was elected from among the university’s most esteemed scholars to fulfill ceremonial and administrative duties as a *primus inter pares*. The institutional mission was to preserve knowledge, add to accumulated understanding, and transmit this intellectual inheritance to the next generation. Any attempt to introduce accountability for performance was routinely rejected as an attack on academic freedom. A similar stance was likely to greet efforts to promote educational efficiency, relevance, or quality assurance. This was the “business model” that prevailed in *academe* until well into the 20th century.

6. Over the course of the past two centuries, higher education gradually evolved from an informal relationship between tutors and the students who paid for their classes into a formal institution in which the governments of the emerging nation-states took growing interest. Universities became public as well as private affairs. In established nations such as France and the United Kingdom, where elite interests controlled the machinery of government, the state became first a financier of higher education and subsequently a controlling shareholder. In the United States, the “land grant” system of publicly funded and managed state universities was established in 1862 as a complement to private universities. In newly independent former European colonies, the departure of colonial administrations created a sizable capacity deficit and prompted government initiatives to establish national universities that provided free higher education to entice students into preparing for eventual public service.

7. As governments became the proprietors of public universities, they tended to expect a degree of loyalty from the institutions in return for their support. Unfortunately, they did not always get it. When staff and students took it upon themselves to criticize governmental policies or actions in the name of academic freedom, politicians were not pleased. Whether by presidential fiat or legislative degree, they sought to curb such excesses by bringing the institutions more closely under the protective wing of government. On the other hand, public universities were often viewed as extensions of the public service and therefore became inviting targets for political patronage. In either case, the result was the same: increased government intervention in the affairs of the academic community.

8. By the 1990s, governments were heavily invested in a “state control” model of higher education management in which they sought to directly influence key aspects of university affairs (Neave and Van Vught 1994). In Asia, for example, governments – not the academic community – directly appointed university leaders in 55 percent of universities surveyed (Markham 1996). Likewise, in Australia a large proportion of university council members were selected by the Minister of Education or the provincial governor, or were members of parliament (Fielden 1996). In numerous countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Head of State served as Chancellor to the public universities, appointed their senior officers, and chose a significant portion of university council members (Ajayi, Goma and Johnson 1996: 168, 180). Only in Latin America were universities able to enjoy the traditional autonomy derived from the republic of scholars

model – in spite of a wave of military governments in the 1970s and 80s that sought to impose direct controls on the academic community.

9. As the end of the millennium drew near, leaders and policymakers in higher education began to feel that the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of state controls. Rapidly growing numbers of institutions and students, leading to the phenomenon of massification, had created a plethora of activities that exceeded the control capacities of government ministries. Government attempts to manage these more complex systems centrally created unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies that eventually attracted public calls for reform. Moreover, as the winds of market capitalism and the breezes of democratization swept across the globe following the fall of the Soviet Union, concerns to encourage a withdrawal of the state from non-essential public management functions increased competition in all spheres of productive life, and decentralized representative decision-making structures pushed to the fore. In higher education, the outcome of these processes was for the state to step back from direct involvement and seek to operate at arms' length. This produced the "state steering" model of higher education management in which governments sought to entice, guide and nudge institutions of higher education towards their policy goals through a combination of incentives and sanctions (Neave and Van Vught 1994).

Autonomy with Accountability

10. The outgrowth of these dynamic interactions was the present approach to institutional governance and management in higher education, which may be termed the "autonomy with accountability" model (Neave and Van Vught 1994). On the one hand, it seeks to provide institutions with the freedom and flexibility necessary to control their own fate as they are buffeted by the tides of change and the challenges of competition from home and abroad. On the other hand, it strives to ensure that institutions are good stewards of public funds, provide quality education in return for public support, and produce graduates, research and services that are relevant to the needs of society and the economy. In short, institutions should be largely free to manage their own affairs – and be held accountable for their performance in doing so in pursuit of government policy objectives. Striking the right balance between autonomy and accountability is as much policy art as policy science, and the devil is inevitably encountered in the details. Yet finding a balance appropriate to each country's respective capacities and circumstances is put forward here as a worthy goal for developing countries and is the assumption that can be found behind the analyses that follow.

11. But after more than a decade of adjustments and reforms, enough experience has been generated to allow for a discernment of trends and an identification of promising innovations. If the challenge is a correct balance between autonomy and accountability, then its fulcrum can be found in the governance arrangements that mediate between the two. For universities, the key mechanisms of governance are the institution's governing board and its senior management team. Who they represent, the extent of their authority, how they are held accountable, and how they interact have a direct bearing on the performance of the institution (Salmi 2009: 26-31; Aghion and colleagues 2009:3). Because of this, university governance has become a major focus of higher education

reform initiatives around the globe (Stensaker and others 2007; Kearney and Huisman 2007; Fielden 2008).

12. Three caveats are appropriate at this point. First, university governance arrangements vary widely, not only among countries, but also among institutions within the same country. As a result, it is extremely difficult to say that a particular practice is representative of a particular country, except where national framework higher education legislation sets uniform provisions for all institutions.³ In the following discussion, when reference is made to a particular country, the reader should bear in mind that the matter under discussion may pertain to some, but not necessarily all, universities in that country. Second, the following analysis is based primarily on public universities. That is because public universities are far more likely to make information on their statutes or acts, as well as on their governing boards, publicly available on their websites.⁴ Although it was assumed that comparisons of governance structures between public and private universities would be instructive, little insight was achieved in this study due to these data constraints. As a result, this comparison remains as a fruitful topic for future research. Third, although it is not addressed directly in this discussion, it should be remembered that university autonomy can also be curbed when these institutions are subject to civil service rules and regulations that affect their ability to hire and fire staff, determine salaries, manage their own budgets, and control their own assets, among others.

Global Trends in Autonomy and Accountability

13. As university systems around the world have become larger and more complex, governments have found it more effective to disengage from direct management control of individual institutions and instead, to steer them at arm's length by increasing their autonomy while putting in place mechanisms of accountability to ensure that enhanced freedoms are not misused. Apart from governments' inability to administer dozens of institutions, thousands of academic staff, and tens of thousands of students, the move towards increased institutional autonomy seeks to respond to the accelerating pace of change by enabling greater management flexibility, responsiveness, efficiency, and space for innovation. At the same time, new accountability mechanisms create positive and negative incentives, as well as various types of system oversight bodies, to monitor and reward institutional performance in the pursuit of public policy goals. Many of these incentives are financial. They are provided through formula-based funding, institutional performance contracts, and competitive awards. Others are based on reputation, as imputed through accreditation or institutional rankings. However, the topic of the present discussion is university leadership. Thus, trends in university autonomy and accountability will be reviewed here only as they pertain to university leadership as it is expressed in the roles and responsibilities assigned to institutional governing boards and senior officers.

³ This was the case in 34 of the 74 countries studied.

⁴ To address this limitation, a short questionnaire was emailed to 164 senior officers of 98 private universities in 36 countries representing all geographic regions. Regrettably, only four responses were received.

14. *University Autonomy.* Numerous informed observers have underscored a nearly universal worldwide trend towards increased autonomy in the management of university affairs over the past decade or so. Fielden (2008: 11) perceives a strong international trend to make universities independent self-governing institutions. Salmi (2007: 224) notes that greater management freedom has recently been awarded to universities in Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Denmark, and Germany. Fielden (2008: 43) also sees a gradual withdrawal of the state from decisions surrounding the appointment of the chairperson of the governing board, the board members, and the institution's chief officer.

15. In Europe, a recent major review of university governance arrangements reports "new models of governance that redistribute responsibility, accountability, and decision-making power among external and internal stakeholders" (Eurydice 2008: 25).⁵ The same survey concludes that institutions have acquired more autonomy in managing the recruitment, selection, employment, and career advancement of their academic staff, leading to more contractual arrangements and fewer civil service positions in higher education (Eurydice 2008: 22).⁶ The movement towards management corporativism and centralization of decision-making is particularly pronounced as the "new public management" paradigm gains traction (Stensaker and others 2007: 27). This model emphasizes leadership, management, and entrepreneurship more than academic freedom, internal democracy, and the organizing role of academic disciplines (Massen 2007). Consistent with this view, "the role of the university president in most European countries increased in power and importance during the 1980s and 1990s" (Teichler 2000).

16. The march towards increased university autonomy is also underway within developing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the state is stepping back from direct involvement in selecting the chairpersons of governing boards and university chief officers. Governing boards are being empowered to preside over university affairs without the need to obtain Ministerial approval for their decisions (Saint and Lao 2008: 11). In Latin America, Colombia has adopted various international good practices in university governance and management. Chile has recently completed a major assessment of its higher education system, undertaken in collaboration with the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), which will serve as a

⁵ A review by Karran (2007) finds that national legislation provides a "high" degree of university autonomy in 13 of 23 countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. That is, the university is largely self-governing by its own members.

⁶ Another current survey of university autonomy reports on the following indicators: "The share of universities that must get their budgets approved by the government varies from lows of 0 and 13 percent in Denmark and the U.K., respectively, to highs of 100 percent in Finland, France, and Germany. The share of universities that report that their undergraduate students are selected via a centralized mechanism, rather than by the university acting on its own, ranges from lows of 0 in Finland and France and 12 percent in the U.K. to highs of 83 percent in Spain and 100 percent in Ireland. In five countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the U.K.), faculty may be paid different amounts even if they have identical seniority and rank. On the other hand, at least half the universities in countries like France, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland report that they must pay the same amount to faculty with the same seniority and rank" (Aghion and others 2009:8).

basis for defining future policies with regard to institutional governance and management (Uribe and Salamanca 2007). In Asia, Singapore has turned its universities into autonomous self-governing institutions, Vietnam is laboring to shape an indigenous higher education system free from former socialist and colonial legacies, and Pakistan has struggled – but so far failed – to reform the governance and management of its universities (Gilani 2006).

17. *University Accountability.* In the quest for appropriate checks and balances, higher education policymakers have sought to link increased management autonomy with greater management accountability for institutional performance in the use of public funds. For university governing boards, this has had several consequences. First, board members not drawn from the university community or from government have been increased (or in some cases introduced) in the effort to strengthen accountability to employers for the quality of graduate preparation, and to graduates for employment prospects stemming from the relevance of their studies. Indeed, university governing boards in Denmark, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and the United Kingdom are required to have half or more of members external to the institution. Second, clear mandates have been given to boards for institutional strategic planning and for monitoring management's progress in achieving strategic goals. Third, boards are being asked to ensure that institutional resources are used efficiently. As one consequence, board membership appears progressively less likely to be based purely on formulas for the political inclusion of university interest groups (e.g., staff unions, student leaders, administrative staff) and more likely to incorporate technical and professional skills related to financial planning, human resource management, and legal expertise. One outcome of the efficiency emphasis has been a trend towards a reduction in the size of governing boards, as witnessed recently in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and public universities in the United States (Fielden 2008: 37-38; Marshall 2009; Ogle and others 2008; Sporn 2002).

Higher Education Legislative Reform

18. National legislation determines, to a greater or lesser extent, university governance and management arrangements. Changes in national approaches to university autonomy, governance, and leadership inevitably trigger a need to formalize these changes in new higher education legislation. The level of detail in defining governing boards, their composition and powers varies greatly from one country to another. In some countries the national legislation provides a blueprint for what is desired, while in other cases it leaves ample space for institutional leadership to define its own statutes and internal regulations. Nevertheless, reforming institutional governance will often require changing higher education legislation at the national level (Stensaker and others 2007: 19).

19. A review of the approval dates of prevailing higher education legislation in 72 countries around the world shows an apparent trend towards increased reform activity in

this area (see Table 1).⁷ During the 1990s some 26 countries approved new laws defining and regulating their higher education sectors. But during the first decade of the 21st century, this number surged to 46 countries – and this decade is still six months short of completion at the time of writing.

Table 1. Date of Most Recent National Higher Education Legislation

1990 – 1994	1995 – 1999	2000 – 2004	2005-2009
Argentina	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan*
Burkina Faso	China	Austria	Botswana
Colombia	Cyprus	Cameroon	Bulgaria*
Ghana	Czech Republic	Croatia	Egypt
Guatemala	Dominican Republic	Denmark	Estonia*
Nicaragua	El Salvador	Ecuador	Finland*
Peru	Ireland	Estonia	France
Saudia Arabia	Italy	Ethiopia	Greece
Sri Lanka	Kazakhstan	Georgia	Hungary
Sweden	Malaysia	Germany	Iceland
Turkey	Mongolia	Latvia	Indonesia*
Zambia	Netherlands	Lesotho	Jordan
	South Africa	Lithuania	Latvia*
		Mali	Lithuania*
		Morocco	Moldova*
		Mozambique	Norway
		Namibia	Philippines
		Pakistan	Poland
		Romania	Portugal
		Slovakia	Rwanda
		Spain	Singapore
		Switzerland	Taiwan
		Tunisia	Tanzania
		Uganda	Vietnam
		United Kingdom	

* Reportedly under consideration, but not clear if enacted.

Sources: International Association of Universities World Higher Education Database, <http://www.unesco.org/iau/onlinedatabases/>; and national higher education websites.

20. From a regional perspective (see Table 2), legislative reform in higher education has been limited in Asia, possibly because Asian governments have been more inclined to incrementally amend existing legislation than to introduce whole-scale reforms. Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa all show sharp increases in new higher education legislation during the current decade. Factors such as the Bologna Process, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, rapid enrollment expansion, and the growth of private provision have undoubtedly stimulated the need for change. On the other hand, the Middle East and North Africa register a very low and stable rate of legal reform in higher education. Notably, Latin America had a spurt of higher education reform legislation in the early 1990s—possibly prompted by the larger democratization processes underway at the time—but it soon leveled off and has become virtually non-existent over the past five years.

⁷ Countries not included either (a) had legislation dating from before 1990, (b) broad sector-wide legislation covering all aspects of education, (c) a federal system with legislative responsibilities delegated to the state level, or (d) a series of individual university acts instead of integrated national legislation.

21. For the most part, higher education legislation is national in scope and system-wide in coverage in Asia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and areas of the Middle East. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it appears that the trend is away from the practice of individual university acts or charters and towards national framework legislation. In Latin America, however, many countries still treat universities on a case by case basis from a legal standpoint. Consequently, system-wide legislation is limited (and very general) or else non-existent.

Table 2. Date of Most Recent National Higher Education Legislation by Geographical Region

Region ¹	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-09*
Asia	1	3	1	5
Eastern Europe/Central Asia	0	3	7	8
Europe	1	3	6	6
Latin America	5	2	1	0
Middle East and North Africa	2	2	2	2
Sub-Saharan Africa	3	1	8	3
<i>Totals</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>24</i>

*through May 2009.

¹ North America does not appear because neither Canada nor the United States have national higher education legislation.

22. How, then, has the larger movement towards autonomy with accountability—and associated legislative reform—been reflected in the structure, roles and responsibilities of university governance and management arrangements around the globe?

University Governing Boards

23. University governing boards come in all shapes and sizes. They may be called university councils, boards of trustees, administrative councils, university assemblies, senates, syndicates, or something else. Yet all institutions of higher education have some type of highest decision-making body to which university leaders are accountable. Only universities in Taiwan were found to be an exception to this general rule. The mandates, composition, and procedures of governing boards also vary, as does the process for appointing their members. The choices made in defining each of these attributes often make the difference between autonomous, responsive and imaginative leadership and restrictive, rigid and conformist administration – or something in the middle.⁸

24. Although institutional autonomy is necessary for higher education to flourish, it can be held in check by the political economy of the state. High levels of state involvement in the management of higher education, or political intervention in

⁸ The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges in the United States has developed a set of nine booklets that offer good practice guidelines on key areas of governing board engagement, such as policymaking, finances, academic affairs, institutional by-laws, ethics, and member responsibilities. See <http://www.agb.org/wmspage.cfm?parm1=572> for additional information on these publications.

institutional decision-making, can suppress innovation, encourage rent-seeking, and politicize the education system (World Bank 2002:103; Kapur and Crowley 2008: 43). This has been the case, for example, in China and Nigeria in recent years (Brandenburg and Zhu 2007:23; Saint, Hartnett and Strassner 2003). Thus, good governance arrangements will shield institutions from political adventurism. To this end, who controls the selection of members and how the chair of the board is chosen have much to do with the extent of an institution's autonomy in practice. Let us briefly review some of the key choices to be made with regard to university governing boards.

25. *Duties and Responsibilities.* The mandates given to university boards vary widely from one country to the next. In virtually all cases, boards are tasked with defining a strategic vision for the institution, setting institutional policies, monitoring institutional performance, and ensuring good stewardship of the institution's assets. Many (but not all) are charged with approving the university's budget. Some are asked to take on responsibilities for quality assurance and the equivalence of academic awards. Others are allowed to define salary structures, terms of employment for academic staff, and/or recruitment of the institution's chief executive. A few are empowered to set student fees and determine student intake numbers. In general, higher levels of institutional autonomy can be found where boards are given more of these responsibilities.

26. *Board Member Appointment.* The means of appointing board members are essentially four: (i) the Head of State or Prime Minister may control the selection directly (e.g., Lao PDR, Thailand); (ii) the Minister of (Higher) Education may be given appointing authority (e.g., Malaysia, Zimbabwe); (iii) a formula may be defined whereby various stakeholders or constituencies elect their representatives to service on the board (e.g., Argentina, Brazil); or (iv) board members may choose their own replacements through a self-perpetuating process. Fully self-perpetuating boards are most common within private universities, especially in the United States. In practice, these four approaches are rarely found in pure form, and most countries employ a mix of these methods. For example, public university boards in Colombia are comprised of appointees by the Head of State, the provincial governor, and the Minister of Education, together with elected representatives of university deans, professors, students, and alumni. In addition, Colombian boards invite a private sector representative and a former university leader to round out their membership. Although board members are often urged to act with the best interests of the institution at heart, they may also feel a sense of accountability or even loyalty to the person or group who selected them. This may be particularly true in politically charged environments. For this reason, elected stakeholder representation may be preferred as a means of buffering or counter-balancing strong political pressures. Moreover, self-perpetuating boards, if independently established at the outset, have the potential to eliminate the threat of political influence all together.

27. *Appointment of Board Chair.* How the chairperson of the governing board is appointed is another key indicator of university autonomy. The chair holds the power to call meetings, set the agendas, appoint sub-committee membership, cast tie-breaking votes, and generally influence the direction of discussion. If the chair is appointed and supported by government (e.g., Colombia, Kenya, Vietnam), then he/she exercises a degree of indirect government control over the board. If the head of the university chairs the board (e.g., Mauritania, Norway, Sri Lanka), this provides the institution with a large

measure of autonomy. If the board members themselves choose their own chairperson (e.g., Austria, Indonesia, South Africa), the result may reflect the dominance of a particular group within the board, or it may be an affirmation of merit-based choice. Examples of countries where a particular group holds majority representation on the university board are provided in Table 3. Present trends appear to favor merit-based choice of the chair by the board members themselves.

Table 3. Majority Representation on University Governing Boards

Internal ^a	Government	External ^b	No Majority Group
Angola	Kenya	Australia	Austria
Argentina	Zimbabwe	Canada	Chile
Bangladesh		Denmark	Colombia
Botswana		Japan	Cyprus
Brazil		Lesotho	Egypt
Bulgaria		Malaysia	India
Burkina Faso		Mauritius	Rwanda
Cambodia		Singapore	Sri Lanka
Chad		South Africa	United Kingdom
China		Spain	
Czech Republic		Tanzania	
Estonia		United States	
Finland			
France			
Georgia			
Ghana			
Hungary			
Indonesia			
Latvia			
Madagascar			
Mauritania			
Moldova			
Mozambique			
Namibia			
New Zealand			
Norway			
Peru			
Philippines			
Romania			
Slovakia			
Spain			
Vietnam			

^a Includes university managers, academic staff, students, and/or non-academic staff.

^b Persons who are neither representatives of government nor the university community, i.e., private sector, civil society.

28. *Board Composition.* Under the “republic of scholars’ model of university governance noted above, institutions enjoyed nearly full autonomy in that all governance matters were held in the hands of members of the university community. By the 1990s, however, this model became increasingly questioned as offering insufficient accountability for the use of public resources (Paradeise and colleagues 2009: 198; Bleikie and Kogan 2007: 477). Steadily more complex and sophisticated operating environments prompted the inclusion of financial management and legal specialists among board members. Where graduate unemployment was high, concerns with

improving the relevance of university education to the labor market and the national economy prompted the incorporation of representatives from the private sector and professional associations. And as institutions pursued financial diversification through more systematic fund-raising and various types of institutional partnerships, the need was sharpened for a further broadening of the mix of skills contained with the board. As these changes in board composition occurred, universities transitioned from an “old autonomy” in which they were accountable largely to their own members, to a “new autonomy” in which they became broadly accountable to society at large through a high diversity of board representation.⁹

29. This diversity can be achieved in multiple ways. In some cases (e.g., Denmark, Singapore, Spain, United States), nearly all of the board members are drawn from beyond the university and outside of government. In other cases, specific constituencies are earmarked for membership, such as alumni (e.g., Australia, Colombia, Philippines), women (e.g. Tanzania), donor representatives (e.g., University of Cape Town), or the region/locality in which the university is located (e.g., Chile, Malaysia, Spain). As the knowledge economy has gained steam, some universities have elected to include international members on their governing boards in order to tap into a wider range of higher education experience. This is the case, for example, at the University of Botswana, University of Nairobi (Kenya), University of Tokyo, and public universities in Thailand. On balance, however, a broad diversity of skills and experiences within the university governing board seems most likely to equip it with the resources it will need to overcome the continual challenges of changing circumstances and to remain accountable to various university constituencies as the board responds to these challenges.

30. *Large versus Small Boards.* The size of a governing board can influence its flexibility, responsiveness, and general operating efficiency. In the present review, the number of governing board members ranged from fewer than ten (e.g., Austria, Cambodia, Chile, Malaysia) to 50 or more (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Spain, University of Chicago). For the United States, the mean size of public governing boards is 10 members, whereas the mean size of private boards is 30 members (Eckel and King 2006: 11).¹⁰ In recent years a worldwide trend towards smaller, leaner governing boards has been noted (Fielden 2008: 37). A number of British universities, for example, have recently gone through the exercise of reducing the size of their board. The trade-offs, of course, are between breadth of representation and cost-efficiency, and between diversity and homogeneity in viewpoints. But in general, efficiencies in costs and decision-making would seem to argue in favor of board numbers in the range of 15 to 20 members.

31. *Frequency of Board Meetings.* Boards may play a formal almost “rubber-stamping” role, an active semi-executive role, or something in between. Often the frequency of required board meetings can give an indication of which role is expected for a board and how closely they may be monitoring institutional performance. Some boards are required to meet no more than once a year, mainly to receive annual reports and

⁹ In the course of this transition, student representation on governing boards seems to have been reduced.

¹⁰ Because the fortunes of private American universities are tied to the success of their fund-raising efforts, a large number of board members (usually not remunerated) can expand their access to social networks which are critical for generating private donations.

approve the coming year's budget (e.g., Angola, Pennsylvania State University). In these cases, oversight is intermittent and very much at arm's length. Other boards are obliged to meet as much as six times a year, thus suggesting that they will be quite familiar with, and involved in, the main activities of the institution (e.g. University of Cape Town). Notably, governing boards in Argentina, Colombia, and the University of Technology in Mauritius are required to meet on a monthly basis, thus creating the possibility that they might play more of an executive function than a governing one. The norm for Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be two or three meetings annually; the norm for the United States appears to be four times.

32. *Quorum.* Board decision-making requirements may favor timeliness and efficiency, or they may emphasize broad-based agreement. Higher standards for quorum ensure that a decision is based on a fair degree of consensus, thus reducing the possibility of subsequent dispute. Lower requirements for quorum may enable business to be conducted without undue delay. Not surprisingly, practice also varies significantly on this point. The University of Chicago requires the presence of only one-third of its board members, and practice at Pennsylvania State University and the University of Virginia, as well as the University of Ghana, is similar. At the other extreme, quorum for national universities in Vietnam is two-thirds. For the most part, quorum in Asia, Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and North America is 50 percent of membership. Given that important or controversial agenda items are likely to attract high levels of board member participation regardless of quorum requirements, it may be best to set quorum requirements at levels below 50 percent in order to ensure the expeditious treatment of less interesting administrative matters that require a board decision.

33. *Private University Boards.* The limited information obtained on the governing boards of private universities suggests that they tend to mirror the features of public universities in the region where they are located. For example, countries with small public university boards also seem to have smaller private university boards (e.g., Australia). Regions such as Latin America that tend to have rather large public university governing boards also appear to have larger private university boards than in other regions. The United States may be a partial exception to this pattern for reasons explained in paragraph 45 below. Likewise, the composition of private university governing boards seems to reflect dominant composition trends in the public university governing boards. In many Latin American countries, private university governing boards are comprised entirely of senior officers, academic staff, and students – much as the public university governing boards are. In contrast, private university boards in numerous African cases incorporate former government officials just as the public universities frequently include current government officials. This suggests that those who believe that private universities may offer lessons of innovation and efficiency for their public counterparts could be disappointed if the search is limited to a particular region. Better illustrations of innovative and more efficient governance structures can be obtained by comparing the practices in one geographic region with those in other regions.

34. One clear contrast in governing board practice between private and public universities lies in the process whereby board members are selected. In private universities, the founder or owner of the institution is much more likely to appoint governing board members than to allow elected representation by other stakeholders as is

more commonly done in public universities. In the numerous cases where a private university is owned by a religious denomination, church authorities often choose the governing board members. In fact, church officials (often with educational credentials) can comprise a significant portion of membership in such boards. Another area of contrast is that private university boards, especially those with international links, appear more likely to include members from other countries.

Regional Trends

35. *East Asia and the Pacific.* Governance practice among the universities of East Asia and the Pacific is far from uniform (see Table 4). The more traditional model, wherein the university community plays a primary role, prevails in Thailand and, to a lesser extent, in Indonesia and Cambodia. Close government control appears to characterize university governance structures in China, Lao PDR, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. In fact, universities in Taiwan do not appear to have governing boards at all, leaving major institutional decisions to the Ministry of Education or the university president. Philippines universities reflect an American inspired model. Malaysia and Singapore have adopted the “new autonomy” model in which their university boards have strong private sector participation, but little representation from government or the university community. Australian universities (e.g., University of Sydney) employ a mixed governing board of government appointees, alumni representatives, and university community delegates, including students. New Zealand is more traditional, with roughly 60 percent of board members drawn from within the university community. However, the board-elected chairperson must come from among its external members. Japan’s University of Tokyo has a seven-member Board of Managing Directors, chosen by the university president, which must approve all major institutional decisions. This arrangement makes the university a highly autonomous institution and gives vast authority to the university president. In line with global good practice, however, the university has recently taken several voluntary steps to increase its accountability to the public (University of Tokyo 2008: 21). Among these are the introduction of external evaluations of teaching and research performance, increased cooperation with industry, more aggressive dissemination of university produced knowledge, and a strengthening of the university’s alumni network.

36. The winds of change are nevertheless beginning to buffet the more traditional governance structures in several countries. In 2005 Vietnam introduced governing boards within its higher education institutions. In 2008 Cambodia permitted 6 of 13 public universities to establish their own governing boards with broadly representative membership (Mak 2008). Indonesia is in the process of enabling its public universities to become autonomous legal entities governed by their respective boards (Gunawan 2008). The Chinese government is seeking ways to provide greater autonomy to its centrally managed universities (Brandenburg and Zhu 2007:35). Even in Thailand, where universities are treated as governmental units in which financial and personnel matters are managed by the government bureaucracy, an expectation of increased university autonomy has been voiced (Yamnoon 2008). Interestingly, the anticipation of greater autonomy has provoked fierce opposition from academic staff and students.

Table 4. University Governing Boards in East Asia and the Pacific

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Australia	22	12 external, including 5 alumni; 10 internal, including 2 students	6 appointed by Minister; 5 elected by alumni, academic staff and student elected representatives, one chosen by board.	High	Moderate
Cambodia	5 – 11	Majority internal; minority external	By government decree.	Moderate	Moderate
China	30 - 35	All internal	By central government	High	Moderate
Indonesia	21	9 external members; 12 internal members.	Academic Senate selects and Minister approves.	Moderate	High
Japan	8	Majority external; minority internal.	By the university president.	Moderate	High
Lao PDR	NA	NA	By the Prime Minister.	Moderate	Low
Malaysia	8	All external except for university CEO.	By the Minister of Education	High	Moderate
New Zealand	12 - 20	Majority internal Minority external	Internally elected reps 4 by Minister of Education Up to 3 chosen by Board	Moderate	High
Philippines	12	7 internal members; 5 external members.	Head of State appoints 4; remainder are elected representatives of defined constituencies.	Moderate	Moderate
Singapore	22	20 private sector; one from Ministry; University CEO.	By Minister of Education.	High	Moderate
Taiwan	Universities do not appear to have governing boards			Moderate	Low
Thailand	20 - 30	1 or 2 external	Nominated by Board, approved by Minister, and appointed by the King.	Moderate	Low
Vietnam	20 - 25	Up to 30% external, elected by the internal members.	External members are designated by the Party; internal members are elected by their constituencies.	Moderate	Moderate

37. On the basis of reported information regarding the extent of government involvement in university governance and both explicit and implicit forms of accountability to government and/or society, a judgment-based categorization of country governance practices was devised (see Table 5).¹¹ It is intended primarily

¹¹ It was not possible to develop a formal scientific methodology for classifying levels of autonomy and accountability in university governance. Consequently, the classifications presented are based on the author's own judgment in considering the information available. For autonomy, factors taken into account

for use in stimulating further discussion in the comparative analysis of university governance arrangements. The categorization suggests that most countries in East Asia occupy the “middle of the road” with regard to levels of autonomy and accountability in university governance. Levels of accountability, whether to government (China, Lao PDR, Taiwan, Thailand) or to society (Singapore), are generally higher than those of autonomy. Indications of pending policy changes in several countries suggest that institutional self-governance is likely to be strengthened in the future, thus bringing the relationship between accountability and autonomy into better balance.

Table 5. Classification of University Governance in East Asia and the Pacific by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Autonomy Accountability	Low	Moderate	High
Low			
Moderate	Lao PDR Taiwan Thailand	Cambodia Philippines Vietnam	Japan Indonesia New Zealand
High	China	Australia Malaysia Singapore	

38. *Eastern Europe and Central Asia.* During the Soviet era, universities in the countries of Eastern Europe were either managed directly by the state or else operated with strong government oversight. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, higher education reform initiatives began to emerge during the late 1990s and gathered impetus during the early years of the 21st century. In most cases, however, it appears that the ‘reforms’ largely re-instituted the traditional republic of scholars model of university governance that had prevailed prior to the creation of the Soviet Union. In many cases, this re-democratization of the universities has produced democratic environments that exceed those of sister institutions in Western Europe or North America (Scott 2000: 374). In addition to the chief officer, deans and even department heads are democratically elected. Governing bodies are largely comprised of internal university representatives who are elected by their peers, and chaired by the university’s chief officer (see Table 6). As a result, their autonomy is high and their external accountability is low. Only Latin America rivals Eastern Europe in this regard.

include board representation, selection process for chief officer, institutional control over admissions, institutional ability to hire and fire staff, institutional control over budgets and assets, and overall levels of government control. For accountability, factors considered were government, civil and business representation on governing boards; reporting obligations; audit requirements; and forms of government involvement in governance and management.

Table 6. University Governing Boards in Eastern Europe

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Bulgaria	25 – 45	All internal (70% academic; 15% students)	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Croatia	Varies with size	½ internal; ½ external	Representation formula	Moderate	High
Czech Rep	9 – 15	2/3 Internal 1/3 External	By Minister of Education in consultation with the Rector.	Moderate	Moderate
Estonia	25 - 30	All internal; 1/5 student reps	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Georgia	8 - 12	All internal	Elected by each Faculty	Low	High
Hungary	7 - 15	All internal	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Latvia	50 - 60	Largely internal; 20% students	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Lithuania	60 - 70	Internal; 10% students	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Moldova	25 - 35	Internal 15% students	Elected and ex officio	Low	Moderate
Romania	70 - 90	All internal; 25% students	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Slovakia	65 - 70	All internal, 33% students	Elected and ex officio	Moderate	High

39. In Hungary, governing boards with significant external representation were introduced in 1997, but implementation has been bogged down by a centralized political system, resistance to loss of authority by the Ministry of Education bureaucracy, and the general absence of a civil society tradition (Morgan 2000). The Czech Republic introduced similar changes in its Higher Education Act of 1998, apparently with somewhat better results. In Estonia and Romania, the highest governing body is reportedly also the main academic body. It is chaired by the university's chief executive, thus reducing the distinctions between institutional and academic governance (Eurydice 2008: 38). A 2002 Higher Education Act in Slovakia turned universities into self-governing entities run by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Ministry of Education. However, these Boards appear to have been given only limited responsibilities. Croatia introduced reforms in 2003 that suggest a transitional strategy in which Advisory Boards are introduced to all public universities. Half the membership is from the academic community, and the other half is drawn from chambers of commerce, municipal government, and the Parliament. These Boards are charged with formulating institutional development strategy, ratification of decisions taken by the Academic Senate, and

oversight of resource use. Thus, they appear to be less than the standard university board that typically is vested with broader powers. Noteworthy is the fact that many of these Boards include student representation that ranges for 10 to 33 percent of total membership.

40. Information on Central Asian countries is not readily available (e.g., Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). If Kazakhstan is representative of these, then central control of universities is considerable and their autonomy is limited. Government appoints university chief officers, sets admissions, determines curricula, manages staff salaries, owns university buildings and other assets, and determines the composition of governing boards. Universities cannot borrow funds and do not award their own degrees (World Bank and OECD 2007: 20, 128).

Table 7. Classification of University Governance in Eastern Europe and Central Asia by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Accountability \ Autonomy	Low	Moderate	High
Low		Moldova	Bulgaria Estonia Georgia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Romania
Moderate		Czech Republic	Croatia Slovakia
High	Kazakhstan		

41. *Latin America.* University governance in Latin America is still strongly wedded to the ‘republic of scholars’ model of autonomous self-governance by the academic community (see Table 8). The head of the institution normally serves as chairperson of the board, except in Chile and Colombia where the chairperson is generally a government appointee. The university community’s representation on governing boards is broad, often including students and non-academic staff. The selection processes are highly democratic and board deliberations tend to be quite transparent. Board meetings in Argentina, for example, are open to the public. Notably, student representation on governing boards is significant – much more so than in most other geographical regions. Students constitute 20 to 33 percent of governing board members in a number of Latin American countries. In contrast, Colombia institutions give students just one seat, and Chilean institutions leave them out all together. Participation by government is generally limited to a single representative, or else is non-existent. Again, Chile and Colombia are exceptions, reserving one-third of governing board seats for government appointees. Participation by private sector or civil society representatives is rare. Brazilian universities break with the norm by reserving 15 percent of governing board membership for external persons, who are selected by the other board members (all of whom are either academic staff or students). Latin American governing boards tend to be large and rather

unwieldy. Board membership in Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, and Peru can run as high as 70 persons. Yet again, Chile and Colombia are non-conformists, stipulating board membership of less than ten persons.¹² Governing boards in Argentina and Colombia are required to meet monthly, suggesting an expectation of active involvement in institutional affairs. Boards in other countries meet 2 to 4 times a year. Whether the frequency of board meetings has a positive or negative effect on institutional performance remains to be seen, and might be a useful question for future research.

Table 8. University Governing Boards in Latin America

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Argentina	29 – 76	¼ Deans ¼ Professors ¼ Students ¼ Non-academic	Each group elects its representatives.	Low	High
Brazil	55 – 75	2/3 Academics 20% Students 15% External	Each group elects its representatives; Board then selects external members.	Moderate	High
Chile	6 – 9	1/3 Government 1/3 Region 1/3 Academics	Head of state appoints government representatives; academic council selects the rest.	High	Moderate
Colombia	9	1/3 Government 1/3 Internal 1/3 External	1 – Head of State appoints 1 – State govt. appoints 1 – Min. of Educ. Appoints 1 – Deans elect 1 – Professors elect 1 – Students elect 1 – Alumni elect 1 – Private sector rep. 1 – Ex-rector	High	Moderate
Costa Rica	12	1 govt. rep. 11 internal	Election by defined constituency.	Low	High
Honduras	70	1 govt. rep. 1 civil society Rest are internal. (30% students)	By office occupied or by election.	Low	High
Mexico	143– UNAM 50-60 state	All internal	Elected and ex officio	Low	High
Paraguay	38	All internal	By position held or election by defined constituency.	Low	High
Peru	70	All senior officers; All deans; 1/3 students	By position held or election by defined constituency.	Low	High
Uruguay	32	All internal, mostly academics	Election by designated groups.	Low	High

¹² As in other regions, the size of governing boards for private universities is often larger. For example, the private University of the Andes in Bogota, Colombia has 45 board members.

42. The classification in Table 9 of Latin American countries surveyed with regard to levels of autonomy and accountability illustrates graphically the predominant governance profile for the region's universities. Many of them are highly autonomous with little accountability to either government or society.¹³ Chile and Colombia have apparently rejected this prevailing model and have aligned themselves more closely with current international practice.

Table 9. Classification of Latin American University Governance by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Autonomy Accountability	Low	Moderate	High
Low			Argentina Costa Rica Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay
Moderate			Brazil
High		Chile Colombia	

43. *Middle East and North Africa.* Governance structures for universities in the Middle East and North Africa seem to reflect a 'middle of the road' approach (see Table 10). They retain many of the characteristics of traditional European models (especially in Afghanistan and Turkey), with the academic community holding sizable majorities on the boards and the university head often serving as board chairperson. But external representation is larger than under the traditional European model, and it occasionally approaches half of board membership. Much of this external representation is from government. In addition, government (i.e., the Minister for Higher Education) often plays an instrumental role in selecting external non-governmental representatives. One notable variation that appears in Saudia Arabia (e.g., King Saud University) is the practice of including several university presidents – either current or previous – from other institutions on the governing board. The Jordan University of Science and Technology reserves six out of its eight board positions for distinguished national scholars. Legislation in Cyprus provides universities with a diversified governing board that includes ministerial, private sector and professional representatives, as well as two higher education experts – although representatives from the university community still comprise half of the board's membership.

¹³ In fact, institutions in Paraguay and Uruguay require that the head of the university be chosen from within its current senior academic staff.

Table 10. University Governing Boards in Middle East and North Africa

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Afghanistan	12	All internal	By position held or election by designated group	Low	High
Algeria	24	11 – government 13 – internal (2 students)	Government positions are designated; internal positions are elected	Moderate	Moderate
Cyprus	15	½ Internal ½ External	Internal are elected representatives of staff and students; external are appointed by Council of Ministers (4), and by the Senate (3).	High	Moderate
Egypt	25 - 36	Senior officers plus all deans; a few govt. officials	By position occupied, or by Ministerial appointment.	Moderate	Moderate
Jordan	8	1 – Rector 7 –various external	Unclear.	High	Moderate
Morocco	25	11 external 14 internal	External are by position held; internal are elected by designated groups.	Moderate	High
Saudia Arabia	8	5 rectors or former rectors; university secretary general; and 2 external persons.	By government (Minister is the board chairperson)	Moderate	Moderate
Turkey	40 - 60	Appears that the academic Senate is the main governing body. Executive board implements Senate decisions.	By academic position, e.g., dean.	Low	High

44. Compared with Latin America, autonomy of university governance in the Middle East and North Africa is somewhat more circumscribed (Table 11). Governments engage in active steering of institutions, but do not seem to involve themselves directly in university affairs unless a crisis arises. This ensures a degree of institutional accountability to government in Algeria, Egypt and Saudia Arabia. Greater diversity of board representation in Cyprus and Jordan also allows for some accountability to society as well.

Table 11. Classification of University Governance in the Middle East and North Africa by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Autonomy \ Accountability	Low	Moderate	High
Low			Afghanistan Turkey
Moderate		Algeria Egypt Morocco Saudia Arabia	
High		Cyprus Jordan	

45. *North America.* The United States (5,758 institutions) and Canada (303 institutions) contain large and very diverse higher education systems.¹⁴ Accordingly, governance practices are equally diverse (see Table 12). In Canada, governing board membership ranges from 11 persons (e.g., University of Saskatchewan) to 50 persons (e.g., University of Toronto) with an average of 24 members. In recent years there has been a trend to reduce these numbers. Roughly half of the board members are appointed by the provincial government. The other half are representatives of the university community. Notably, student representatives (graduate and undergraduate) generally comprise 10 to 15 percent of governing board membership.

46. In the United States, most colleges and universities (whether public or private) are governed by Boards of Trustees. Board members are rarely academics and nearly always drawn from business and civil society. Students are almost never included. The size of these boards varies considerably, from just 5 at the publicly funded New Mexico State University to 50 or so at private institutions such as the University of Chicago and Boston College. In general, public university governing boards tend to be much smaller than those of private institutions. The mean size of public boards is approximately 10 persons and the mean size of boards at private institutions is around 30 (Eckel and King 2006: 11). The difference may be explained by the fact that board members of private universities often play an important networking role in fund-raising, whereas those in public universities have less need to do so. Thus, the more board members that private universities have, the greater their potential for fund-raising.

47. Most boards elect their own chairpersons. Board members at public institutions are typically appointed by the state government, often after nomination by the governor and approval by the legislature.¹⁵ But in some states and in many community colleges, board members are chosen through general state-wide elections. Boards at private

¹⁴ In Canada and the United States responsibilities for public provision of higher education are decentralized; each province, state or territory is free to regulate higher education as it deems most appropriate.

¹⁵ Notably, the University of North Carolina governing board has 33 members, 32 of whom are elected by the state legislature.

institutions select their own members (called self-perpetuating boards).¹⁶ One out of four governing boards requires some form of alumni representation (Ogle, Toutsis and Novak 2008: 18). Terms of service range from 4 years to as long as 12 years. In at least one case (University of Colorado) the board meetings are required to be open to the public.

48. As the U. S. state public universities have grown in size and established branch campuses that often grow to achieve independent university status, many states have brought these public institutions together under the umbrella of a ‘state system of higher education.’ Examples of statewide public systems include California, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, New York, Texas and many others. These systems are usually governed by a Board of Regents comprised of 6 to 10 persons who set general policies, work to eliminate unnecessary duplication, monitor quality, and promote institutional articulation within the system.¹⁷ To a certain extent, the Boards of Regents play an intermediary or ‘buffering’ role that shields the institutions from overly intrusive state action.

Table 12. University Governing Boards in North America

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Canada	12 – 50	½ external ½ internal	External appointments by Provincial government; internal via elections by groups represented	High	Moderate
USA (public)	5 – 32	Heavily external, with an occasional student / professor representative.	Governor appointed; elected political district representatives; self-perpetuating.	High	Moderate
USA (private)	14 - 50	All external except the president; many are alumni.	Largely self-perpetuating.	High	High

49. In both Canada and the United States, public university governing boards are – by virtue of their composition and appointment procedures – highly accountable to provincial/state governments and to the larger public that supports them (Table 13). Oversight by these governments and significant participation by government appointees on the university boards restricts institutional autonomy somewhat in comparison to that enjoyed by fully autonomous private institutions.

¹⁶ The practice of self-perpetuating boards as also been adopted, at least in part, by public universities in Alabama, Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Vermont (Ogle, Toutsis and Novak 2008: 21).

¹⁷ The Philippine university system has also adopted the Board of Regents model.

Table 13. Classification of North America University Governance by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Autonomy Accountability	Low	Moderate	High
Low			
Moderate			
High		Canada (public) U.S.A. (public)	U.S.A. (private)

50. *South Asia.* University governance in South Asia encompasses some different features and unique vocabulary (Table 14). In Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, the highest authoritative body is called the Senate. But unlike the academic senates of many western universities, this body is more akin to the University Assemblies found in Latin America. It is generally a rather large body (e.g. the University of Mumbai Senate in India has nearly 100 members), and its primary functions are to approve university statutes, ratify budgets, and, in some cases, select candidates to become head of the university. It meets once or twice a year to perform these limited functions. In addition, universities in Bangladesh and Pakistan contain a combined governance and executive body called a Syndicate, composed of 12 to 25 members, which functions under the purview of the Senate and is therefore only roughly analogous to a governing board. However, the Syndicate performs many of the functions normally allocated to a governing board, such as managing university assets, developing the institutional budget, making staff appointments, etc. In both countries the Head of State appoints some or all of the Syndicate's members – even those from the academic community. At the University of Delhi in India, the governing board is called the Court. It contains relatively few academic members and incorporates significant private sector representation. Sri Lanka also has notable external representation on university governing boards, but in this case the external appointments are made by the University Grants Commission. Of all the countries, Afghanistan appears to have the most traditionally European arrangement, whereby all board members are drawn from the academic community. Notably, most of South Asian countries explicitly reserve some board seats for women representatives.

Table 14. University Governing Boards in South Asia

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Afghanistan	12	All internal	By academic position held or as elected representative of designated group.	Low	High
Bangladesh	12 - 17	Majority internal; 2 educationalists named by HOS; 2 govt. appointees; 1 citizen selected by Academic Council	4 by govt.; rest are elected by designated groups.	Moderate	Moderate
India	12 – 25 10-12 IITs	Great variation	Appointed by authorities; elected by constituencies.	High	Moderate
Pakistan	25 - 30	100% appointed by the Chancellor	All by high political authorities (Head of state or governors)	High	Low
Sri Lanka	23	½ Internal ½ External	Internal members are designated by office held; external members are selected by the University Grants Commission.	High	High

51. Levels of university autonomy and accountability vary widely in South Asia (Table 15). Autonomy is high in Afghanistan because it is self-governed by the academic community. Substantial and varied external representation contributes to increased accountability among the university governing boards of India and Sri Lanka. However, the high accountability of boards in Pakistan and Sri Lanka is of the negative sort, reflecting close government control of the member appointment process. In Pakistan the Head of State directly names all board members and government controls numerous other aspects of university administration. During the period of 2000 to 2005, a movement emerged in Pakistan to strengthen university autonomy, reduce government interference, and improve the lines of accountability. Unfortunately, this initiative was not strong enough to overcome entrenched political interests.¹⁸ In Sri Lanka the University Grants Commission appoints all of the external board members, sets staff recruitment and appointment procedures, approves staff appointments, selects candidates for chief officer for approval by the Head of State, controls student admissions, and even approves overseas travel by academic staff (World Bank 2009: 58-59). In addition, administrative

¹⁸ One observer reports, “The main battles emerged with the chancellors, vice chancellors, and some senior members of the education bureaucracy. The chancellors foresaw an erosion of their unchecked powers. Most of the vice chancellors were concerned because the proposed reforms envisaged a transparent process of selection, a system of accountability of their performance, and checks on the blanket emergency powers they enjoyed. The systematization of university governance would similarly erode the power of the education bureaucracy” (Gilani 2006).

staff postings are managed by the government, and general public service and treasury regulations for government also apply to the universities.

Table 15. Classification of South Asia University Governance by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Accountability \ Autonomy	Low	Moderate	High
Low			Afghanistan
Moderate		Bangladesh	
High	Pakistan Sri Lanka	India	

52. *Sub-Saharan Africa.* Drawing from models of university governance in various European nations and the United States, often enhancing them with local adaptations, higher education institutions in Africa generally reflect the range of good practice that has emerged worldwide. University governing boards in Africa are usually of reasonable size (with notable exceptions in Angola, Chad, Kenya, and South Africa) and many of them display a balance of stakeholder interests in their formulas for board representation (Table 16). As a result, universities in half of the countries surveyed enjoy fairly high degrees of autonomy while providing reasonably good levels of accountability to government and society. Nevertheless, a wide range of practice is found. University governance in Angola and Burkina Faso follows the traditional model of self-governance by the academic community with little outside involvement. Others, such as Chad, Djibouti and Mauritania, mix academic with government representatives. More common, however, is a blend of academic, government, and various types of non-governmental representatives. Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania are good examples of this approach. Of particular note is the practice – followed by Botswana, Kenya and Namibia – of including one or two international experts in higher education within governing boards in order to tap into experiences elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, in some cases (i.e., Kenya, Zimbabwe) government cannot resist poking its fingers into the university pie by according senior government officials the entitlement of appointing a significant number of governing board members.

Table 16. University Governing Boards in Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Angola	Large	Internal	By position	Low	High
Botswana	19	7 government 9 internal 1 alumnus 2 international	Government representatives are designated by position; Internal members are elected representatives of designated constituencies. Others are selected by the Board.	Moderate	Moderate
Burkina	35	6 government, rest	By position held, or as elected	Low	High

Faso		are internal.	representative of internal group.		
Chad	33	25 internal; 8 external.	By position held, or as elected representative of internal or external group	Moderate	Moderate
Djibouti	20	9 internal; 11 external.	8 appointed by Government; 9 internal by position held or as elected representative of an internal group; 3 external selected by Minister.	High	Moderate
Ghana	15	8 internal; 4 external; 3 from government	Government representatives are designated by position; Internal members are elected representatives of designated constituencies. Others are selected by the Board.	Moderate	High
Kenya	30 – 35	15 external; 13 – 18 internal; 2 international.	10 appointed by Head of State; 2 student reps; external by Minister; internal by position or elected representative; and international selected by Board.	High	Moderate
Madagascar	11	7 internal; 3 government; and 1 external	By position or as elected internal representative.	Moderate	Moderate
Mauritania	24	5 government; 17 academics; and 2 students.	By position or as elected internal representative	Moderate	High
Mauritius	10	7 external; and 3 internal.	7 appointed by Prime Minister; 1 elected rep from professors, students, and non-academic staff.	High	Moderate
Mozambique	21 – 27	13 – 19 internal; 5 external; 3 government.	By position, elected rep., appointment, or invitation by Board	Moderate	High
Namibia	23	12 internal; 9 government; and 2 international.	6 appointed by Head of State; 2 from government; 1 from local government; 2 students, and 10 officers and academic reps.	Moderate	High
Rwanda	16	8 internal and 8 external	7 government appointees; 6 academics; 2 students; and 1 from private sector.	Moderate	Moderate
South Africa	30 – 38	Must be 60% external.	By position held, by government appointment, or by election.	High	High
Tanzania	11 – 21	Must be 75% external; one student rep required.	Roughly half are government appointees; others are elected by defined constituencies	High	Moderate
Zimbabwe	44	19 government; 17 internal; and 8 external.	Most are appointed by the Minister, even when they are the elected representative of a group.	High	Low

53. The full range of university governance possibilities can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 17). Autonomy ranges from high to low, as does accountability. The

traditional highly autonomous self-governing university model can be found in Angola, Burkina Faso and several other countries. A number of countries have introduced board representation formulas that provide accountability to government (e.g., Kenya, Zimbabwe), to society (e.g., South Africa, Tanzania), or to both (e.g. Botswana, Mauritius).

Table 17. Classification of Sub-Saharan Africa University Governance by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Accountability \ Autonomy	Low	Moderate	High
Low			Angola Burkina Faso
Moderate		Botswana Chad Madagascar Rwanda	Ghana Mauritania Mozambique Namibia
High	Zimbabwe	Djibouti Kenya Mauritius Tanzania	South Africa

54. *Western Europe.* For the most part, the strong European tradition of university autonomy is retained in governance arrangements, particularly in Austria, Finland, Portugal and Spain. But accountability representation has been strengthened considerably in recent years, and external members – generally in the minority – are now common on most university governing boards (Table 18). In many cases, notably Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the governing board itself chooses its external members, thus preserving a high degree of institutional autonomy. In the process, the influence of academic senates has been diluted by stakeholder boards (Bleiklie and Kogan 2007: 479; Karran 2007: 303).¹⁹ The Netherlands has chosen a strongly corporate model based on a five-member governing (supervisory) board appointed by the Minister of Education (CHEPS 2007). Germany has been struggling with the challenge of governance reform for a decade, its progress encumbered by its decentralized system of federal government in which each of 16 *Länder* (provinces or states) is responsible for its own higher education. Nevertheless, German university governance structures have gradually evolved to limit the role of academic bodies, enhance the powers of the rector and his/her management team, and – as of 2006/2007 – to introduce various types of governing boards. Although the specialized *Grandes Ecoles* in France have a tradition of including representatives of particular professions within their governing structures, public universities have only recently experimented with this practice. In early 2009 the French government decreed the incorporation of external membership in the governing bodies of roughly one-quarter of public universities as a

¹⁹ A similar process has been reported in Sweden by Bladh (2007: 243). The governing boards of Swedish universities have 15 members, 8 of whom are appointed by Government.

forerunner of system-wide adoption of this practice.²⁰ The change has been met with resistance, protest and student strikes that have forced the government to dilute some of its proposals and postpone others (Marshall 2008; 2009). In Spain, comparable reforms proposed in 2001 were met with similar resistance and ultimately watered down considerably (Mora 2002). A notable difference in the governance of Spanish universities is the inclusion of an influential Social Council in addition to the governing board. In spite of its name, the Social Council (which has external members) is responsible for approving the institutional budget and supervising all economic activities, including asset management, fund-raising, income generation, and the setting of student fees.

Table 18. University Governing Boards in Western Europe

Country	No. of Members	Composition	How appointed	External Accountability	Degree of Autonomy
Austria	5 – 9	Half external; half internal	Selected by university senate and appointed by the Minister.	Moderate	High
Denmark	Variable	Majority external; minority internal	External members are selected by the Board; internal members are elected representatives of constituencies.	High	High
Finland	Variable	Majority internal; minority external.	External members are selected by the Board; internal members are elected representatives of constituencies.	Moderate	High
France	30 maximum	Majority internal; minority external (about 25%).	Elected by a General Assembly of university academic and administrative staff.	Moderate	High
Germany	9 - 13	Varies from 1/3 to ½ internal. Rest are external.	Governing boards introduced in 2007. Role can be supervisory or advisory, depending on state (Lander) government decision.	Moderate	High
Netherlands	5	All external	Appointed by the Minister	High	Moderate
Norway	11	4 external; 7 internal	Internal members are elected representatives of constituencies; external members are selected by the Board and appointed by the Minister of Education.	Moderate	High
Spain	30 – 50	All internal	2/3 elected by university community; 1/3 appointed by the Rector	Low	High
U. K.	13 – 25	Half external	By board	Moderate	High

55. European university governance is characterized by strong traditions of institutional autonomy that are being reined in by more diversified governing board

²⁰ Other reforms include a halving of governing board membership to roughly 30 persons, the freedom to spend their publicly financed budget as they see fit, and to directly hire and fire staff (which is currently managed as part of the public service apparatus).

representation intended to introduce greater accountability. Nevertheless, high levels of university autonomy can still be found in most European nations (Table 19). Pushed by re-thinking prompted by the Bologna Process, university governance arrangements in Europe appear to be in a dynamic phase in which further reforms and adjustments are likely. Denmark seems to have gone the furthest in strengthening accountability within university governance arrangements without limiting institutional autonomy – mainly by having a majority external membership selected by the governing board itself.

Table 19. Classification of Western European University Governance by Levels of Accountability and Autonomy

Autonomy \ Accountability	Low	Moderate	High
Low			Spain
Moderate			Austria Finland France Germany Norway United Kingdom
High		Netherlands	Denmark

56. *Innovations.* In comparing university governance practices around the world, one is struck by various innovations to the established ways of doing things. For example, Estonia, Hungary, and Spain have instituted *advisory bodies*. These bodies serve as mechanisms for bringing external guidance to bear on institutional governance, but their approval is not required for any decisions and they possess no formal responsibilities vis a vis the institution. Members are normally drawn from beyond government and the academic community. The main purposes of an advisory body are to support cooperation between the institution and the Ministry of Education, to improve connections between the institution and society, and to introduce external perspectives on the institution's development strategy (Eurydice 2008: 40). Latvia, Poland and Slovenia give institutions the option of creating an advisory body, but they are not required to do so. The University of Tokyo has taken the advisory body to a higher level by creating a President's Council that comprises 28 specialists from 15 different countries. Meeting twice a year as a brain-storming forum, the Council explores ideas for reform, possibilities for innovation, and new initiatives needed to maintain competitiveness in the 21st century (University of Tokyo 2008: 17).

57. Another inventive governance mechanism is the *Conselho de Curadores* (Trustees Council) found in Brazilian public universities. Headed by a chairperson who is external to the university, this Council is charged with monitoring use of the institution's financial and physical assets. Specifically, it can inspect financial accounts at any time, comment on the budget and annual financial report, and register an opinion on any proposal involving the use of university property, the contracting of loans, the creation of special ear-marked financial funds, or the receipt of donations that might carry

financial implications for the future. In essence, its mandate is to ensure full transparency in the use of university resources. The Council's membership varies from 5 persons at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro to 12 persons at the Federal University of Bahia. In Mexican universities, a small body called the *Patronato* plays a similar role. Universities in Spain have an analogous but more influential mechanism, called a Social Council, which has 15 to 25 members. It is chaired by a person external to the university and the majority of its members are also external. It is charged with not only overseeing financial matters, but also managing them. Thus, it approves the annual budget, manages the university's assets, approves the annual financial report, develops income generation activities, and sets fees. Thus, it goes further than the Brazilian Trustees Council or the Mexican *Patronato* in separating financial oversight from daily management and expenditure decisions.

58. In the United States, numerous steps have been taken in recent years to improve the accountability and performance of university governing boards in both the public and private spheres. A recent survey found that two-thirds of all boards assess their own performance, with half of public university boards doing this on an annual basis. Three-quarters of private universities conduct performance evaluations of individual board members, most often at the end of a term of service prior to possible reappointment. Virtually all boards provide an orientation program for new members with an emphasis on higher education finances.²¹ Also, nine out of ten boards now have a conflict of interest policy for their members, whereas only 46 percent had such a policy twenty years ago (AGB 2009).

59. Additional examples of pioneering governance practices are the inclusion of international members on the governing boards of universities in several African countries in order to increase access to worldwide good practices, and the requirement that governing board members sign performance contracts at the National University of Rwanda.

²¹ Other topics were trustee responsibilities, the mission and history of the institution, its strategic priorities, and current challenges.

University Leadership and Management

60. A number of terms are used around the world as titles for the leader and chief executive officer of an institution of higher learning. They most commonly include President, Rector, and Vice-Chancellor. The senior officers who serve directly under them are generally titled as vice-presidents, vice-rectors, deputy vice-chancellors, registrars, and secretary generals. Together they make up the senior management teams of universities. For the purposes of this discussion, all of them will be referred to as university leaders, chief officers, or managers.

61. *Leadership roles.* The role of chief executive officer in a university is defined in direct relationship to the role of the governing board. Weak boards tend to be associated with strong institutional leaders. Conversely, empowered boards are likely to result in a more bounded – and perhaps more accountable – role for the chief officer.²² Consequently, university leadership can be a highly autonomous and very powerful decision-making position, or it can be somewhat more circumscribed, charged with implementing policies and plans approved by the governing board and making routine management decisions associated with these responsibilities.

62. Insights into the extent of the university leader's authority can be gained from four pertinent indicators. They are: (i) how the leader is selected and the accountability relationships implicitly associated with that process; (ii) the extent of the leader's control of the institutional agenda by chairing the main decision-making boards and councils; (iii) the extent to which the leader is empowered to appoint key subordinate staff such as deputies and deans; and (iv) the extent to which institutional decisions are made through a representative collegial process or concentrated in the hands of a small management team or administrative committee headed by the chief officer. For example, a chief executive officer appointed directly by the head of state who chairs an academic governing body comprised of university staff and students, appoints his/her deputies and deans, and is not answerable to a higher level governing board is likely to be quite powerful. On the other hand, a chief executive who is selected by the institution's governing board, is formally accountable to it, and is expected to work with senior officers chosen on their merits and deans elected by their faculty peers will be obliged to pursue a more consensus-based style of decision-making. Thus, university leadership roles range from the autocratic boss to the democratic manager.

63. *Selection Criteria.* The professional profile required of the incumbent is another aspect of university leadership. Traditionally, the head of a university was expected to be an esteemed scholar, often a titled full professor, from within the same university. This is still the case today in Algeria, Paraguay, Turkey, and Uruguay. Near the end of the 20th century, however, an emphasis on entrepreneurship and professional management experience associated with the 'new public management' perspective was adopted in a

²² Again, there are exceptions. The small but authoritative board of the Olin College of Engineering in the United States, once it reaches agreement on its strategic vision, fully empowers its chief executive officer to implement it.

number of countries (Kelly 1998; Lynn 1998; Peters and Pierre 1998).²³ As applied to public higher education, this called for seasoned corporate executives to head the universities and led to subsequent experimentation with this approach, particularly in Australia and the United Kingdom.²⁴ Challenging this notion, a recent comparison of leadership profiles with institutional performance concluded that a causal link appears to exist between a leader's research abilities and future university performance; that is, top universities are led by better scholars (Goodall 2006).

64. *Selection process.* University leaders are chosen through one of three main procedures, or variations on these (see Table 20). The first is by appointment, usually by a senior government official such as the Minister of (Higher) Education, Prime Minister, or Head of State (e.g., Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, Kenya, Thailand, Turkey). In some cases, the official makes this choice from a short list of three names forwarded by the university governing board or academic council. In others, the university body forwards a single recommendation, which the official must either accept or reject. The second procedure is election by the university community. Sometimes a large representative body, called a University Assembly, is convened especially for this purpose (e.g., Argentina, Peru). Occasionally students are permitted to participate in this process (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Uruguay). Interestingly, some election processes assign differential weights to the votes of various constituencies. For example, the votes of academic staff may count more than those of non-academic staff or students (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, Norway). Notably, in Indonesia the government's representative on the Board of Trustees is entitled to 35 percent of the ballot while the remaining 65 percent is distributed equally among all other Board members. In some cases, the government must approve the candidate elected (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Vietnam). The third method is selection by the governing board. Frequently, a public call for nominations is issued and selection is openly competitive (e.g., Finland, Germany, Ghana, Lithuania, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom). Sometimes competitive international recruitment is undertaken (e.g., Denmark, Kenya, Taiwan).

65. Markham (1996) has further broken down the selection process into six distinct practices. These have been employed in Table 18 to categorize the different countries surveyed. Again, it should be remembered that, where comprehensive national higher education framework legislation does not exist, these classifications are derived from reviews of just a handful of institutions. Thus, they may or may not be representative of country-wide norms.

²³ Compared to other theories of public administration, New Public Management is more oriented towards outcomes and efficiency through better management of public budgets. It is pursued by applying competition to organizations in the public sector and by emphasizing economic and leadership principles. New public management tends to view beneficiaries of public services as customers, and citizens as shareholders.

²⁴ Because of strong dependence on financial development strategies for institutional sustainability in American higher education (both public and private), selection criteria for university leaders in the United States have tended to emphasize public relations, marketing, fund-raising, and financial management skills acquired in the higher education sector – ideally coupled with academic qualifications.

Table 20. Methods of Appointing University Chief Executive Officers, by Country.

Appointed by Head of State;* no consultation with university Governing Board.	Appointed by Head of State;* formal consultation with univ. Governing Board.	Appointed by Government from list submitted by Governing Board or selection committee.	By university election or appointed by Governing Board, with approval from Government	Appointed by Governing Board which has more than 1/3 of members from Government.	Direct election by univ. community, or appointed by Governing Board which has little or no Government representation.
Afghanistan Algeria Angola Botswana Burkina Faso Cambodia Chad China Cyprus Djibouti Egypt Lao PDR Mauritius Pakistan Rwanda Saudia Arabia	Kenya Zambia Zimbabwe	Bangladesh Brazil India (federal) Mauritania Morocco Mozambique Sri Lanka Taiwan Tanzania Turkey	Canada Chile Czech Republic Estonia Ghana Hungary Latvia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Moldova Romania Singapore Slovakia Thailand Vietnam	Indonesia Philippines Taiwan	Argentina Australia Austria Colombia Costa Rica Denmark Finland France Honduras Italy Japan Mexico Namibia Netherlands Norway Paraguay Peru Portugal South Africa Spain Uruguay United States

*or the Chancellor who is appointed by the Head of State, Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, or the Governor of a State or Province.

66. *Chief Officer Chairmanships.* In virtually all cases, the chief officer serves as chairperson of the institution's academic decision-making body, often called an Academic Council or Senate. This arrangement provides the chief officer with some management control over the wide range of academic issues that may in some cases require ultimate approval by the governing board. It also enables the chief officer to serve as a communication link between the academic council and the governing board, providing background and clarification of issues as necessary to inform the board's decision-making. Less commonly, the chief officer serves as chairperson of the governing board and is accorded full voting rights. This is most likely to be the case in highly autonomous institutions—particularly in Latin America—in which the governing board is comprised entirely of representatives from the academic community (e.g., Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Italy, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uruguay). Where this is the case, the chief officer exercises considerable control over institutional decision-making processes, and the position is therefore a very powerful one. At the opposite end of the spectrum, some countries stipulate that the role of the chief executive on the governing board must be restricted to that of resource person, and the chief officer is not permitted to vote on board decisions (e.g., Algeria, Colombia).

67. *Authority to Appoint Subordinate Officers.* If the chief officer is allowed to select and appoint his/her subordinate officers in constituting a management team, then he/she is clearly the chief executive and accountable for the management performance of the institution.²⁵ Examples of such an arrangement include Brazil, the Czech Republic, Colombia, Indonesia, Mozambique, and Turkey. If the chief executive is not permitted to select and appoint his/her subordinate officers, then possibilities for divided staff loyalties and competition from subordinates seeking to position themselves to become the future chief officer may be introduced. Where this is the case, subordinate officers may be appointed by government (e.g., Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Vietnam), selected by the governing board (e.g., Austria, Ghana, Japan, Kenya, Peru, Philippines), or elected by the university community (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Peru). However, it is not unusual for government or the governing board to be required to consult with the chief officer before arriving at their decisions. Under the traditional decentralized university governance model, faculty deans are elected by their peers. Recently, however, trends towards strengthening of executive management in European universities have resulted in the appointment of faculty deans instead of election (Eurydice 2008: 4). A similar shift can be found in Australian universities (Gamage 2000). Faculty deans in Angola and Mozambique are also appointed by the chief officer.

68. *Institutional Decision-making Styles.* The two principal decision-making processes in universities worldwide are either collegial or executive. But it is not uncommon to find a mix of the two, particularly where a transition from decentralized collegiality to centralized executive management is underway. In broad brush terms, it appears that collegial decision-making is more common within the universities of Africa, Latin America and some parts of Asia (e.g., India), whereas centralized executive management seems to predominate in Europe, North America, and other parts of Asia (e.g., China, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam). Centralized executive management might further be classified into two different sub-types. The first is centralization that reflects the broader concentration of power within the national political system, implied lines of accountability between the chief officer and senior political officials, and a somewhat less democratic political system. The second is centralization that arises from a conscious strategic decision to seek a more agile and efficient management structure, explicit lines of accountability to government and society as a whole, and a somewhat more democratic political system.

69. *The Management Team.* The composition of an institution's senior management team is usually defined in the legal act or law that constitutes the university. The number of positions in the team varies from three to as many as ten. Commonly, at least in modestly sized institutions, these comprise the chief officer, an officer responsible for academic affairs,²⁶ and an officer responsible for administrative and financial affairs.²⁷

²⁵ Subordinate officers normally include vice-presidents, vice-rectors, or deputy vice-chancellors, and chief administrative/financial officers.

²⁶ Including the title of Registrar in higher education systems that follow the British model, and Provost in the American system.

²⁷ Commonly called the Bursar in British-oriented systems and Secretary General in French-inspired systems, including parts of Latin America.

As the number increases, it is typical to find a senior officer charged with student affairs. Subsequent senior positions may be dedicated to strategic development, research management, and/or international relations. Larger numbers of senior officers (i.e., vice presidents) appear to characterize American and French universities.

70. *Private University Management.* Private university management does not seem to differ significantly from that of public universities in terms of the number of senior managers (e.g., vice presidents). Although notable variation occurs, most private universities seem to include half a dozen senior managers on their management team. Differences do occur, however, in how these managers are deployed. A review of private university websites suggests that private universities are more likely than public universities to assign a vice president responsibility for public relations, information technology, and/or human resources.

71. *Regional Trends.* As shown in Table 18, the methods for selecting the chief officer of a university run the gamut from firm government control to complete institutional autonomy. To the extent to which generalization is possible, it appears that considerable autonomy characterizes the procedures for selecting chief officers in the United States, large parts of Europe, and most of Latin America. Much less institutional autonomy in making these decisions can be found in the Middle East, North Africa, parts of Africa, and some countries of Asia. Notably, 16 countries – including Canada – pursue a ‘middle way’ in which university initiative in selecting its leadership is ratified by government. No particular region dominates this group, and it includes reformist (e.g., Chile, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania) as well as non-reformist countries (e.g., Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Turkey).

72. *Management Innovations.* Universities across the globe have created several additional mechanisms to facilitate institutional management. Perhaps most striking are the three-person Executive Boards instituted by The Netherlands which replace the single chief executive officer and bring a corporate team approach to running its public universities. Notably, the University of Tokyo relies on a Management Council to handle important administrative matters. It comprises the university president, several directors or academic staff members appointed by the president, and influential outside individuals who must make up half of the Council’s membership. The Council deals with regulations, remuneration policies, benefits, tuition and fees, budget creation, assessment of management performance, and other matters. In Argentina, a six-person Executive Board (*Junta Ejecutiva*) is charged with implementing decisions taken by the governing board. It is chaired by a vice-president and made up of the secretary general, one dean, one professor, one graduate student, and one undergraduate student. In Turkey, very similar functions are performed by an Administrative Board comprised of all deans and three elected professors, which is chaired by the university president.

73. Increasing attention is also being given to strengthening management accountability. In the United States, for example, nine out of ten public and private universities conduct annual performance assessments of their chief officers (AGB 2009: 3). As a complement to such appraisals, various initiatives seek to provide senior university officers with training in leadership and professional management skills. Globally, the Association of Commonwealth Universities offers management skills

development training focusing on human resource management and research management, while the International Association of Universities supports a Leadership for Higher Education Reform program that seeks to expose emerging new university leaders to reform experiences from around the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa, management development initiatives range from a regional leadership development program launched by the Association of African Universities to a recent proposal for the creation of a Pan-African Institute of University Governance (Mvé-Ondo and colleagues 2009).

Concluding Thoughts

74. This preliminary exploration of the range of worldwide practices with regard to the role and composition of university governing boards and university leadership selection processes (and their implied accountability relationships) offers ample evidence that diversity is their main characteristic. Practice varies considerably from one country to another, and often within countries as well – particularly where responsibilities for higher education are delegated to state governments. For most, however, the overriding challenge is much the same: “to find a way to reconcile traditional higher education, corporate culture and democracy” (Vukasović 2009: 14).

75. To this end, but not without numerous exceptions, the following global trends appear underway at present:

GOVERNING BOARDS

- The affirmation of universities as self-governing institutions with ultimate decision-making authority vested in a governing board.
- More diverse composition of governing board members, especially with regard to the incorporation of persons from outside government and the university community.
- Increasing use of formulas for determining board membership, often on the basis of elected representation, in place of government appointment of board members.
- Reduction in the overall numbers of governing board members.
- Occasional supplementation of governing board expertise through the establishment of formal or informal advisory bodies.
- Some inclusion of international members on governing boards in order to keep abreast of global happenings, a practice that seems likely to increase in the future.

INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP

- A clear shift to empowering governing boards to select university chief executives rather than government, although government sometimes retains veto power over the board choices.
- Increased transparency, the use of merit-based criteria, and competitive evaluation in the recruitment of university chief executives.

- Emergent willingness to engage in world wide recruitment.
- Some experimentation with the recruitment of non-academic chief executives.
- Greater concentration of decision-making authority in the chief executive and management team, to the detriment of former collegial practices.

76. Perhaps the best current example of a reform that embodies many of the above trends is the radical change to Finland's higher education system voted in by its Parliament in mid-2009. Governing boards must now have at least 40 percent external membership, although universities are given the option of exceeding this level. Instead of being elected by the academic community, the chief officer will henceforth be chosen by the governing board and be accountable to it. In addition, the chief officer will no longer be required to be a professor of the university in question, as is currently the case. The legal status of universities will also change, making them independent legal entities instead of units within the government apparatus. As a result, academic staff will cease to be public servants hired by government and become employees of their respective universities. Finally, universities will take control of their buildings and other physical assets, which are currently owned by government (Dobson 2009). A better illustration of prevailing trends in university governance and management would be hard to find.

77. Looking ahead, issues of comparative higher education governance and management will continue to offer fertile ground for additional research. For this, three topics in particular stand out. One is the issue of legal intention versus actual practice in university governance. Is the formal purpose of the law consistent with its observable practice in the daily interpretation and application of these legal frameworks, or does the process of application, mediated by various social interests within the university community, undermine the original intent of the law in significant ways? Another topic would probe the conventional wisdom that private higher education institutions are more efficient than public ones by seeking empirical substantiation of this belief. Are private universities really more efficient than public ones and if so, in what ways do these efficiencies manifest themselves? The third is the important empirical question of whether some governance models or management structures produce a more positive impact on institutional performance than do others. In other words, to what extent does the choice of a government/management model affect the overall success of the university endeavor? It seems likely that these and related questions will attract heightened interest as global and regional competitions for students, academic staff, and resources – and for prominence in the world university rankings that influence them – intensify during the present period of global economic downturn.

Attachment 1**Countries and Universities Surveyed**

F= National Framework Legislation; I = Institutional act, statutes or website.

Country	Universities	Legal Document*
Afghanistan	Higher Education Act of 1989	F
Algeria	Loi d'Orientation de l'Université, 14 April 1999	I
Angola	Estatuto Orgânico de la Universidade Agostinho Neto, 2001	I
Argentina	Universidad de Buenos Aires Universidad de Cordoba University de La Plata	I I I
Australia	University of Sydney Act as amended in 2004 University of Notre Dame	I I
Austria	University Organization and Studies Act no. 102 of 9 August 2002	F
Bangladesh	Jahangirnagar University National University of Bangladesh Act of 1992 University of Chittagong	I I I
Botswana	Tertiary Education Act of 2005	F
Brazil	Federal University of Bahia University of Campinas Federal University of Rio de Janeiro Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul	I I I I
Bulgaria	Law on Higher Education of 1995 as amended through 2004	F
Burkina Faso	Loi d'Orientation de l'Education no. 013 of 2007 Université de Ouagadougou, 1991	F I
Cameroon	Loi Portant Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur, 2001	F
Canada	University of Calgary University of Manitoba University of New Brunswick University of Saskatchewan University of Toronto	I I I I I
Chad	Université de Adam Barka d'Abeche, 2003 Université de N'Djaména, 1994 Université Polytechnique de Mongo, 2003	I I I
Chile	University of Antofagasta University of Bio-Bio University of Valparaiso Pontifical Catholic University	I I I I

Country	Universities	Legal Document*
Colombia	University of the Andes (private)	I
	University of Cartagena	I
	National University of Colombia	I
	University of Sucre	I
	University del Valle	I
Costa Rica	National University of Costa Rica	I
Croatia	Science and Higher Education Act of 2003	F
Cyprus	Unified Laws to regulate the establishment, control and operation of institutions of tertiary education	F
Czech Republic	Higher Education Act no. 111 of 22 April 1998	F
	Anglo-American University	I
Denmark	Universities Act of 2003	F
Djibouti	Decree No. 2006-0009 – Creation of the University of Djibouti	I
	Decree of July 24, 2007 – Statutes for the University	I
Egypt	University of Alexandria	I
	Ain Shams University	I
Estonia	Universities Act of 1995 as amended in 2003	F
	University of Tartu	I
	Tallinn University of Technology Statutes, 2004	I
Ethiopia	Higher Education Proclamation of 2003	F
Finland	Universities Act no. 645 of 27 June 1997	F
France	Loi d'orientation de l'enseignement supérieur 1984 (Savary Act)	F
	Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités 2007.	F
	Université de Bourgogne	I
	Université de Poitiers	I
	Université de Strasbourg	I
	Université de Toulouse	I
	Ecole nationale supérieur de chimie Montpellier	I
	Ecole nationale supérieur des techniques avancées	I
Georgia	Law on Higher Education, 2004	F
Germany	Framework Act for Higher Education of 1999 as amended in 2004	F
	University of Bonn, 2007	I
	University of Hamburg	I
	University of Heidelberg, 2006	I
Ghana	University of Ghana, 1961	I
	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, 1961	I
	Cape Coast University, 1992	I
	University of Development Studies, 1992	I
Honduras	National University of Honduras	I
Hungary	Higher Education Act of 2005	F

Country	Universities	Legal Document*
Iceland	Universities Act of 2006	F
India	Indian Institutes of Technology Act, 1961	F
	University of Mumbai	I
	University of New Delhi	I
	Panjab University, Chandigarh	I
	University of Rajasthan, Jaipur	I
	Berhampur University	I
	Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, Statutes of 1975	I
	University of Calcutta	I
University of Gorakhpur	I	
Indonesia	Universitas Gadjah Mada, Government regulation no. 153 of 2000	I
	University of Indonesia	I
Italy	Higher Education Law no. 168 of 1989	F
Japan	University of Tokyo	I
Jordan	University of Science and Technology	I
Kenya	Universities Act of 1985	F
	University of Nairobi, 1995	I
	Kenyatta University, 1985	I
	Egerton University, 1987	I
	Moi University, 1994	I
Laos PDR	National University of Laos	I
Latvia	Law on Institutions of Higher Education, 1995 amended to 2006	F
	Daugavpils University	I
	University of Latvia	I
Lebanon	American University	I
Lesotho	Higher Education Act of 2004	F
Lithuania	Law on Higher Education of 2000	F
	Vilnius University Statutes of 2002	I
Madagascar	Université de Antsirana	I
Malaysia	Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971 as amended	F
	National University	I
Mexico	Ley Orgánica de la Universidad Autónoma de Chihuahua	I
	Ley Orgánica de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico	I
	Ley Orgánica de la Universidad de Guanajuato, 2007	I
Mauritania	Decree 2006 – 097 – Université de Nouakchott	I
Moldova	Technical University of Moldova	I
Morocco	Loi no. 01.00 de 19 Mai 2000 portant Organisation de l'Enseignement Supérieur	F
Mozambique	Lei do Ensino Superior, 2003	F
	Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 1998	I
	Universidade Pedagógica	I
Namibia	Higher Education Act of 2003	F
	University of Namibia Act, 1992	I

Country	Universities	Legal Document*
New Zealand	Education Act of 1989	F
	Education (Tertiary Reform) Amendment Act 2002	F
	Massey University Charter of 2003	I
	University of Auckland Charter of 2003	I
Netherlands	Delft University of Technology	I
	Leiden University	I
	Maastricht University	I
	University of Twente	I
	Utrecht University	I
Norway	Universities and University Colleges Act of 2005	F
Paraguay	National University of Asunción, Paraguay, 2005	I
Peru	National Agrarian University of La Molina	I
	National University of San Marcos	I
	National University of San Augustin	I
	National University of Trujillo	I
Philippines	Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997	F
	University of the Philippines	I
Portugal	University of Porto	I
Romania	University of Bucharest	I
	University of Alexandru Ioan Cuza	I
	Babeş-Bolyai University	I
Rwanda	Higher Education Law of 2005	F
	National University of Rwanda	I
	Kigali Institute of Science and Technology, 2001	I
Saudia Arabia	King Saud University	I
Singapore	National University of Singapore	I
	Nanyang Technological University	I
Slovakia	Higher Education Act, 2002	F
	Comenius University Statutes 2008	I
South Africa	Higher Education Act of 1997	F
	University of Cape Town, 2002	I
	University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2006	I
Spain	Ley de Ordenación Universitaria, 2001, as amended in 2007	F
	University of Granada Statutes, 2003	I
	University of Barcelona	I
Sri Lanka	Universities Act, no. 16 of 1978 as amended through 1995	F
	University of Colombo	I
Taiwan	Universities Act of 2007	F
Tanzania	Universities Act of 2005	F

Country	Universities	Legal Document*
Thailand	Chiang Mai University	I
	Mahidol University	I
	Naresuan University	I
	Prince of Songkla University	I
Turkey	Higher Education Act no. 2547 of 4 November 1981	F
	Istanbul University	I
	Istanbul Technical University	I
	Marmara University	I
Uganda	Universities and Other Tertiary Institutions Act of 2001	F
United States	University of Alabama System	F
	Auburn University	I
	Boston College (private)	I
	University of Chicago (private)	I
	University of Colorado	I
	Howard University (private)	I
	Kansas State University	I
	University of Montana System	F
	Morehouse College (private)	I
	New Mexico State University	I
	Oberlin College (private)	I
	Olin College of Engineering (private)	I
	Oregon State University	I
	Pennsylvania State University	I
	Pomona College (private)	I
	University of Texas System	F
University of Vermont	I	
University of Virginia	I	
Wisconsin University System	F	
Uruguay	Ley Orgánica de la Universidad de la República, 1958	I
Vietnam	Regulation on the Organization and Operation of Vietnam National Universities of 12 February 2001	F
Zambia	University Act of 1992	F

* F = national framework legislation; I = institutional act, statutes or website.

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