

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: NCO00003236

NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION
(Loan Number 79290-CN)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$ 150 MILLION

TO

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

FOR A

TAIYUAN URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

December 4, 2014

Transport & ICT Global Practice
East Asia and Pacific Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 2014)

Currency Unit=RMB or Chinese Yuan
US\$ 1.00 = RMB 6.15

FISCAL YEAR

[January 1 – December 31]

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

EA	Environmental Assessment
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMP	Environmental Management Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
PLG	Project Leading Group
TMDRC	Taiyuan Municipal Development and Reform Commission
TMFB	Taiyuan Municipal Finance Bureau
TMG	Taiyuan Municipal Government
TMUTCC	Taiyuan Housing, Rural and Urban Construction Commission
TPMO	Taiyuan Project Management Office
TPTGC	Taiyuan Public Transport Group Co.
TTPB	Taiyuan Traffic Police Brigade
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
Sub-PMO	Sub-Project Management Office

Vice President:	Axel van Trotsenburg
Country Director:	Bert Hofman
Senior Global Practice Director:	Pierre Guislain
Practice Manager:	Michel Kerf
Project Team Leader:	Xiaoke Zhai
NCO Team Leader:	Xiaoke Zhai

CHINA

TAIYUAN URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

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DATA SHEET

A. Basic Information			
Country:	China	Project Name:	China: Taiyuan Urban Transport Project
Project ID:	P081615	L/C/TF Number(s):	IBRD-79290-CN
NCO Date:	12/1/2014		
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Original Total Commitment:	USD 150.00M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 0.38M
Revised Amount:	USD 0.38M		
Environmental Category: A			
Implementing Agencies: Shanxi Department of Finance			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	11/20/2006	Effectiveness:		01/12/2011
Appraisal:	09/08/2008	Closing:	06/30/2016	07/15/2014
Approval:	06/10/2010			

C. Ratings Summary	
Performance Rating by NCO	
Outcomes:	Not Applicable
Risk to Development Outcome:	Not Applicable
Bank Performance:	Moderate Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Public administration- Transportation	3	
Urban Transport	97	

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
City-wide Infrastructure and Service Delivery	100	

E. Bank Staff

Positions	At NCO	At Approval
Vice President:	Axel van Trotsenburg	James W Adams
Country Director:	Bert Hofman	David R. Dollar
Practice Manager:	Michel Kerf	Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez
Project Team Leader:	Xiaoke Zhai	Shomik Mehndiratta
NCO Team Leader:	Xiaoke Zhai	

F. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/10/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.375
2	04/08/2012	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.375
3	11/11/2012	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.375
4	05/17/2013	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.375
5	12/13/2013	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.375
6	06/23/2014	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.375

1. Context, Project Development Objectives, and Design

Country and Sector Issues

1. Urbanization is occurring on an unprecedented scale in China. In 1985, China's urban population was less than 25 percent of China's total population. By 2005, it had reached 43%. This urbanization process has been defined by the growth of a large number of major cities, and a restructuring of land-use patterns – both leading to more complex transport patterns that present a formidable development challenge.

2. Urbanization has been accompanied by an unprecedented rate of motorization. At the time of project preparation in 2008, national-level private car ownership remained relatively low by the standards of other middle-income countries at about 11 per 1,000 persons, but in the richer cities the level was already 80-100 per 1,000 people. The explosive growth in car ownership and use is expected to continue for the foreseeable future, with a seven-fold increase predicted from the 27 million in 2008.

3. Taiyuan municipality, the capital city of the central Chinese province of Shanxi, had a population of 3.7 million and an urban population of 2.8 million at the time of project preparation. The municipality did not benefit proportionally from China's post-1978 economic reform process. By 2001, average disposable income of Taiyuan's urban residents was US\$940 per capita, ranking 125th among China's cities and below the national average. However, since 2001, and particularly after 2003, Taiyuan experienced faster economic development and achieved a double-digit year-on-year GDP growth, which raised the average disposable income of Taiyuan's urban residents to US\$1,520 by 2005, the 67th in the country and equal to the national average. Like many other Chinese cities, Taiyuan Municipal Government (TMG) embarked on a rapid program of infrastructure investment that it considered essential for sustaining and increasing its recent economic success. In 2006 and 2007, the City spent almost US\$1 billion annually on improving its transport infrastructure.

4. The National Road Safety Law, promulgated in 2004, explicitly values safety over mobility and focuses especially on the most vulnerable road users. The State Council (via Opinion #46 of October 2005) and the Ministry of Construction, in official documents and public announcements, promoted the prioritization of public transport in cities. It was identified, at the time of project preparation, that Taiyuan had an opportunity to develop transport infrastructure that reflects the needs of public transport and non-motorized modes that were still the mainstay of majority of its residents.

Rationale for Bank Involvement

5. As of 2008, the Bank had been China's urban development partner for over fifteen years, during which it had lent over \$1.5 billion for 11 urban transportation projects, supporting cities with coordinated urban and transport development, public transport improvement and reform, mobility management, people-centered transport development, and improvement of planning, investment and management practices. The Government of China had asked the World Bank to support urban infrastructure

development in Taiyuan as part of its program to support the ‘Rise of Central China.’ TMG had explicitly noted that it was looking for the Bank to provide not just financing, but advisory support to strengthen its urban transport planning, operational and management practices.

6. The project was consistent with the 2006-2010 Country Partnership Strategy discussed by the Board on May 23, 2006, which sought (among other objectives) to improve the competitiveness of China’s various regions and the overall investment climate, and to address the needs of disadvantaged groups and underdeveloped areas through financing infrastructures. Specifically, the project supported the objectives of: (a) promoting balanced urbanization; (b) reducing poverty, inequality, and social exclusion; (c) financing sustainable and efficient growth; and (d) improving public and market institutions.

Project Development Objective

7. The project’s development objective was to improve mobility on selected transport corridors of the city center of Taiyuan Municipality in Shanxi Province of the Borrower in a safe and efficient manner.

Project Components

8. The project included the following four components:
- a) **Part 1: Road Infrastructure.** Construction of: (a) Taihang Road, a north-south arterial at the east end of Taiyuan city, including bridges, interchanges and overpasses; and (b) extension of Nanzhonghuan Road providing access to a proposed railway station in the south.
 - b) **Part 2: Public Transport.** (1) Development of a bus priority scheme on Xinjian street of Taiyuan city, including lanes for buses and associated infrastructure; (2) Construction of: (a) bus depots in Nanhan and Beiyong localities in Taiyuan city, and (b) bus terminals in Yingxin, Zoo, and Beiyong localities in Taiyuan city; and (3) Design and installation of an automated vehicle location and Bus Dispatching System.
 - c) **Part 3: Traffic Safety and Management.** Carrying out of a program on selected main transport corridors in Taiyuan city to improve the safety and efficiency of traffic movement for all road users consisting of: (a) construction of pedestrian facilities; (b) construction of bicycle facilities; (c) carrying out of channelization at selected junctions; (d) installation of traffic signs and markers; (e) acquisition and installation of equipment for traffic management; and (f) carrying out road safety measures, including an integrated performance-based program over a selected portion of Jiefang Road.
 - d) **Part 4: Institutional Development.** Carrying out a program for strengthening the capacity of Taiyuan municipality to implement the Project and to undertake additional transport infrastructure investments, including carrying out of studies, formulating appropriate policies, and provision of equipment, training, and technical assistance.

Costs and Funding

9. Table 1 summarizes project costs and financing plan.

Table 1: Project Costs and Funding

Component	Total Cost (\$ million)	World Bank Loan (\$ million)
Roads	228.97	97.29
Public Transport	70.93	28.56
Traffic Safety	27.30	20.76
Institutional Strengthening	3.01	3.01
Front-end fee	0.375	0.375
Total	330.59	150.00

10. Taiyuan Municipality decided that loans from domestic banks would contribute 54 percent of the required counterpart funds and the rest would come from municipal capital investment funds. A special-purpose state-owned infrastructure development company set up for this purpose would obtain the loan funds from domestic banks.

Implementation Arrangements

11. Shanxi Province, as the Project Implementing Entity, implemented the project through TMG. TMG established a municipal Project Leading Group to provide policy guidance and coordination support to the project. A Project Management Office (TPMO) established under the Taiyuan Municipal Development and Reform Commission facilitated project preparation and was later the primary coordinating body for project implementation.

12. The following arrangements were made to implement each project component and to operate and maintain completed project financed assets:

- (a) Taiyuan Municipal Urban Construction Development Department (TMUCDD), a project development agency under the Taiyuan Municipal Housing, Rural and Urban Construction Commission (TMUTCC), was designated the employer for Part 1 of the Project. The road would be turned over to TMUTCC for operation and maintenance.
- (b) Taiyuan Public Transport Group Company (TPTGC), wholly owned by the city, was the implementing and operating agency for Part 2 of the Project, except for those involving urban road developments and modifications, such as busways and busbays, which would be implemented by TMUCDD. The completed roadways would be turned over to TMUTCC. All other elements of the component would be owned and operated by the TPTGC.
- (c) TMUTCC would supervise implementation and management of Part 1 and Part 2 on behalf of the city government.
- (d) Taiyuan Traffic Police Brigade (TTPB) of the Taiyuan Public Security Bureau, a government agency, would be responsible for Part 3 of the Project.

- (e) TPMO would be responsible for Part 4 of the Project.

Major Project Risks at Appraisal

13. A comprehensive risk assessment was carried out at appraisal to identify project risks and mitigation measures. The overall residual risk, after mitigation, was rated moderate/substantial. All residual risks in each case was rated either moderate/substantial or moderate, with two exceptions: (a) the city's primary interest would be to facilitate higher motor vehicle mobility, compromising the other components and the PDO; and (b) the detailed traffic safety and management program for the project would likely change as priorities evolve.

Quality at Entry

14. The project had been through a seven year preparation period since it was listed in the lending program in 2003. Initially, the city had envisaged road construction and wastewater treatment as major components of the project. After preliminary discussions with the Bank and internal consultation, in early 2006 the municipality proposed a transport-only project, with some initial thoughts on public transport and traffic management. Preparation was slow because the city did not have experience designing public transport projects, and the agencies did not have enough capacity to support project preparation. It took a prolonged preparation period to fix the project scope, conduct feasibility studies of proposed activities, and reflect a balance between the need for roadway expansion and the demands of public transport and non-motorized modes that were still the mainstay of residents. Eventually, the project focus shifted from road construction to comprehensive improvements to urban transport. During preparation, the project benefited from participatory planning processes, and efforts were made in the feasibility studies to address the issues raised by the public.

15. At entry, the project components were clearly defined and complementary to each other: a) A Road Infrastructure Component that was fundamentally needed to enhance the city's traffic capacity, which was also in line with the Municipality's prioritized interest; b) A Public Transport Component with an innovative bus priority scheme on Xinjian Street, which was envisaged as a high-quality demonstration activity; c) A well designed Traffic Safety and Management Component that addressed the needs and safety of non-motorized road users, with the recognition that institutional issues and coordination would be key to a successful implementation.

16. Concerns on implementation delays were raised at Project Entry. Risks of delays in domestic decisions and approval processes and change in city leadership were particularly identified and mitigation measures were proposed.

2. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation

Post-Approval Experience

17. **Major delays in finalization of designs.** The project was negotiated on April 15, 2010, approved by the Board on June 10, 2010, signed on November 2010, and became effective on January 12, 2011. Project implementation progress was slow and progress was mainly on the engineering design and bidding documents preparation of Road Infrastructure, Public Transport, and Traffic Management components. For each component, it took two years on average to acquire government approval of the designs, which happened only after several rounds of reviews and revisions, before starting work on the preparation of the bidding documents. The delays in approving the designs were partially due to the lack of a strong coordination among relevant agencies given the complexity of design, and uncertainty of local linked projects. In addition, the design works of roads were usually carried out by the Design Institute based on its professional knowledge and rarely engaged other stakeholders in the design process. As a major comprehensive urban arterial road serving both transport and living functions, the design of the main project road, Taihang Road, for example involved not only the roadway itself, but also the designs and careful considerations of traffic signaling, traffic channelization, bus stops, pedestrian crossings, road safety, lighting and greening. Bank implementation support missions encouraged the design institute to take into account issues relating to traffic management, bus operation, and non-motorized road users, and urged the PMO to facilitate discussions between the Design Institute, Traffic Police and Public Transport Group Company to avoid design discrepancies and mismatches. Linked local project also delayed design progress. In 2012, the preliminary design of Component 2 was not approved by the government because the city planning bureau was considering the possibility of replacing the underground utility pipes together with the bus priority works.

18. **Delays in obtaining counterpart fund.** As the design finally moved forward, a new set of problems emerged. Project implementation was halted by delays in provision of counterpart funds. Inadequate counterpart funding largely constrained land acquisition and resettlement of Taihang Road. As of November 2010, Taiyuan Municipal Government had only raised less than 15 percent of the total counterpart contribution. At the time of project preparation, Taiyuan identified a state-owned special-purpose infrastructure development company as the borrowing entity for domestic commercial bank loans. The company, however, was closed as a result of the State Council's policies issued in 2010 regarding the strengthening of regulations for local borrowing platforms. The Bank team continuously expressed concerns and urged Taiyuan on the need for timely provision of counterpart funds. Because of the limited amount of counterpart funding, the land acquisition and resettlement of Taihang Road had to be suspended; as time passed, the funding gap became larger because resettlement costs became higher than originally budgeted not only due to the passage of time, but also due to the a change in government policy on resettlement and compensation in 2011. Bank implementation support missions met with senior municipal leaders to stress the importance of timely availability of counterpart funding and Taiyuan promised to solve the issue. Yet, Taiyuan Municipal Government assigned another investment company – Taiyuan Longcheng

Development Investment Ltd. Company – to take over the responsibility of raising domestic loans only in 2013.

19. **Lack of experience in site identification and land acquisition.** Another reason for land acquisition and resettlement delays was the implementing agencies' lack of experience regarding site identification and land acquisition. The locations of the five depots and terminals under Part 2 were determined primarily based on a master plan, and the difficulties of carrying out land acquisition were under-estimated during project preparation. TPTGC, the implementing entity of this component, was a company responsible for the city's public transport operation and had minimal experience with land acquisition and resettlement. It encountered difficulties in initiating the process for acquiring the land for the depots and terminals, and failed to get support from district governments that were the legal bodies charged with carrying out resettlement and land acquisition.

20. **Linked projects.** Delays in the reconstruction of Xinjian Road (outside the Bank supported project, using local funds) held up the implementation of the Xinjian Road Busway. In 2012 Taiyuan proposed to construct green belts along both sides of the right-of-way of the Taihang Road, concurrently with the Bank-financed project. The green belts, however, were not included in the original project design and were not covered by the approved Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). The proposal, which was subsequently dropped, would have led to an expansion of land acquisition, would have increased costs, and would have required additional time for the revision of the RAP.

21. **Leadership changes.** The project was complex and required strong coordination at high level. The project components (i.e. Taihang Road, Traffic Management, and Public Transport Improvement) belong to three different urban transport sub-sectors that were supervised by different vice Mayors of the Municipality. A project leading group responsible for the supervision and coordination of key issues was created in 2008 and chaired by the Mayor, who had closely guided the project preparation. The Mayor moved in April 2011 and a new Mayor took over the role only in 2013. During the two-year interval, the project was temporarily supervised by several city officials at the vice Mayor level and lacked effective high-level coordination. The operation suffered from fragmented arrangements, and the city's commitment to the original project design was affected.

22. **Changes in Taihang Road function.** In 2013, the municipality made a proposal to change Taihang Road's function from a primary road to an urban expressway. This change would require changes to the original design by replacing at-grade intersections of Taihang Road with separate interchanges, partially eliminating traffic lights, and replacing a bridge by an embankment. Taiyuan also decided to complete the Ring Road (of which Taihang Road is the east segment) by the end of 2014 and started the construction of several underpasses and overpasses at the intersections with Taihang Road under domestic projects. The Bank, after a review of the proposed design changes, conveyed to Taiyuan that the objective of completing Taihang Road by end of 2014 could

not be achieved given the design variation, procurement issues, and large scale of construction works.

23. Considering the proposed changes and the difficulties in implementing the original project activities before loan closing date, Taiyuan proposed to drop the construction of Taihang Road, Nanhan Bus Depot and Zoo Bus Terminal from the project, and to finance the Taihang Road part with domestic funds. These components represented 70 percent of the loan (about\$105 million), and taking them out of the project would significantly affect the overall project design.

24. **Non-compliance with project Resettlement Action Plan.** While discussions of the new proposed plan changes and proposed restructuring were ongoing, the Bank was informed that the resettlement for Taihang Road had started in March 2013. The Bank urged Taiyuan to provide resettlement progress reports and reminded Taiyuan that the Bank's safeguard policies should be complied with in the implementation of all project activities, including the Taihang Road. On December 31, 2013, the independent external resettlement monitoring agency submitted to the Bank a report showing that Taiyuan Municipality did not adequately compensate for land belonging to state-own enterprises and institutes, and thus was not in compliance with the project Resettlement Action Plan (RAP).

Reasons for Cancellation

25. Project implementation was significantly and consistently behind schedule since the Bank loan became effective on January 12, 2011. After more than three years of implementation, no contracts had been awarded under the project and no disbursement made from the loan except for the front-end fee (US\$375,000). Project implementation had been adversely affected by a series of events mentioned above. The problems encountered made it hard to achieve the original project development objectives and there were no readily available components for replacement of the original activities through restructuring. After internal consultation, the Borrower determined that it would be difficult for Taiyuan to continue with the project and achieve a satisfactory result, and proposed to cancel the project and fully prepay the disbursed amount of the loan.

3. Assessment of Bank Performance

26. Based on a request from the Government of China, the Project was listed in the Bank's China lending program as early as 2003. The Bank held substantive discussions with Shanxi Province and Taiyuan Municipality to reach agreement on project design and incorporated lessons learned and good practices. A considerable amount of time was taken to achieve a unified scope at project entry.

27. During implementation, the Bank provided training to the PMO and the PIUs on Bank policies and technical support to improve designs and seek leadership supports from Taiyuan, Shanxi, and National Government. The Bank involved the provincial government in discussion of project issues and timely communicated with the national government on key issues as they emerged. However, though the potential

implementation risks were identified at project preparation, the mitigation measures proposed didn't work effectively in practice and the Bank team's interventions had limited impacts on implementation.

28. Despite the lack of progress during the first two years, the Bank was optimistic that issues that emerged relating to design, counterpart funds, and resettlement could be resolved and based on the experience of similar urban transport projects in China, the project could be completed and the project development objectives could be achieved. So the Bank team focused its attention on design, land acquisition, and counterpart funding issues. However, despite the Bank's efforts it became evident that the issues could not be resolved and it would not be possible to achieve the project development objectives.

29. Two failures of the Bank also contributed to the unsatisfactory result, namely underestimation during project preparation of the implementation risk, and the significant length of time that the Bank took to agree with the Municipality on the necessary changes required to improve implementation, including decisions on restructuring.

30. Considering all of above, the Bank's performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

4. Assessment of Borrower Performance

31. Taiyuan and the Bank had established a common vision of the urban transport priorities in Taiyuan through extended dialogue and project preparation that resulted in the appraisal, negotiations and Board presentation of a project with acceptable quality at entry. However, Taiyuan's investment priorities changed and the new municipal leadership no longer had the earlier ownership of and commitment to the project. These issues were exacerbated by the lack of high-level coordination and delays in design approvals, unresolved funding gaps, and land acquisition delays and lack of compliance with the Bank's resettlement policies and the project RAP. Since early 2012, the project implementation was rated unsatisfactory.

32. Shanxi Province, as the project implementing entity identified in the Project Agreement, did not provide adequate leadership for the project despite the establishment of a supervision mechanism at the provincial level. The coordination in practice turned out to be weak and insufficient.

33. The Ministry of Finance, as the representative of the Borrower, acted promptly at a later stage, and its effective consultations and firm decisions brought the project to a decisive closure.

34. Considering all of above, the Implementing Entity's performance is rated unsatisfactory.

Rating: Unsatisfactory

5. Lessons Learned

35. **Continuous leadership, strong communications, and practical arrangements for implementation are vital for urban transport projects.** Experience of this project demonstrates that urban transport projects are complex in terms of design and implementation arrangements. Project implementation requires high-level coordination and extensive communication among relevant implementing agencies. The municipal Project Leading Group may not be effective because of changes in Mayors and Deputy Mayors. During project implementation, substantial communications with relevant authorities and agencies need to be conducted to seek continuous support to the agreed project designs and to ensure the activities can be carried out in a fully coordinated and integrated manner. A capable and experienced leading agency is important for coordination; relying on a project management office only is insufficient. In addition, the responsibility assigned to the implementing entities should align with the expertise of the agency involved. The arrangements for agency cooperation should be practical and easy to execute.

36. **Timely availability of counterpart fund for all project components is critical to smooth project implementation.** During project preparation, Taiyuan Municipality decided to use domestic bank loans for about 54 percent of the counterpart funding. By the time of project launch in 2010, Taiyuan Municipal Government only raised less than 15 percent of the total counterpart contribution. The issue of lack of counterpart funding halted land acquisition and resettlement and resulted in implementation and disbursement delays. Moreover, when the national policy unexpectedly became stricter on local-government-backed borrowings through investment companies in 2010, the city was substantially affected and unable to mobilize funding for projects under construction. The issue of counterpart funding shortage was also a symptom of the city's priority change and lack of ownership. For future projects, the availability of counterpart funds needs to be carefully evaluated through fiscal analysis and an institutional analysis of the client city's debt financing capacity, and mitigation measures shall be in place during project preparation. City's commitment to the proposed activities may be secured by allocating counterpart funding through each year's fiscal budget. In addition, as local debt issues have added implicit risks to the financial stability of many Chinese cities, a thorough analysis of the realism of proposed counterpart funding plans is in order.

37. **Advancing engineering designs at preparation stage will reduce the risk of changes and speed up project implementation.** When project implementation lasts relatively long (5 years), many changes of local policy, plans and investment priorities may happen. The project was appraised and approved after the Feasibility Study was completed, while preliminary designs for most components hadn't started. To reduce the uncertainties and minimize the design changes after project approval, one option is to advance engineering design at preparation stage and require finalized preliminary design by negotiations or by Board presentation.

Annex 1 Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/Specialty
Lending (from Task Team in PAD Data Sheet)			
Shomik Mehndiratta	Sr. Transport Specialist	EASCS	Task Team Leader
Syed Ahmed	Lead Counsel	LEGES	
Junxue Chu	Senior Loan Officer	LOAG	
Pierre Grafteaux	Peer Reviewer, Senior Urban Transport Specialist	ATFTR	
Anthony Bliss	Peer Reviewer, Lead Road Safety Specialist	EWSTR	
Hubert Nove-Josserond	Peer Reviewer, Senior Transport Specialist	SASTR	
Christopher Bennett	Former Task Team Leader	EASIN	
Edward Dotson	Former Task Team Leader /Consultant	EASIN	
Zong Yan	Transport Specialist	EASCS	
John Scales	Sr. Transport Specialist	EASCS	
Zhai Xiaoke	Transport Specialist	EASCS	
Lu Yan	Transport Specialist	EASCS	
Wang Chaogang	Sr. Social Scientist	EASCS	
Zeng Jun	Social Development Specialist	EASCS	
Wang Peishen	Environment Specialist/Consultant	EASCS	
Yang Dawei	Procurement Specialist	EAPCO	
Dong Yi	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	EAPCO	
Deng Fei	Transport Specialist	EASIN	
Teresita Ortega	Program Assistant	EASIN	
Jean-Marie Braun	Highway Engineer/Consultant	Consultant	

Peng Xuan	Team Assistant	EACCF	
Supervision (from Task Team Members in all archived ISRs, if available)			
Liu Zhi	Lead Infrastructure Specialist / Task Team Leader	EASTS	
Holly Krambeck	Transport Economist	EASIN	
Haiyan Wang	Senior Finance Officer	CTRDM	
Jianjun Guo	Procurement Specialist	EAPPR	
Wei Wang	Junior Professional Associate	EASIN	
Yi Yang	Transport Analyst	EASCS	
Yuhui Jiao	Transport Specialist	EASCS	
Gladys Frame	Traffic Management and Road Safety Specialist, Consultant	Consultant	
Kang Hu	ITS Consultant		

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY04	2.9	19.26
FY05	18.21	92.68
FY06	8.75	27.90
FY07	19.59	115.82
FY08	27.63	120.87
FY09	33.18	108.20
FY10	5.74	37.04
Total:	116.00	521.77
Supervision/NCO		
FY11	11.28	51.57
FY12	8.24	37.51
FY13	8.13	34.03
FY14	10.35	42.52
Total:	38.00	165.63

Annex 2 List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document
2. Loan Agreement Signed on November 2, 2010
3. Project Agreement Signed on November 2, 2010
4. Project Preparation and Supervision Mission Aide-Memoires 2003-2013
5. Letters between the Bank and the Borrower on the Management Issues (2010-2014), Proposal of Full Repayment (May 6, 2014), and Cancellation of the Project (May 21, 2014).

Map

1. IBRD 36446
2. IBRD 36447