This paper proposes a preliminary economic model of political clientelism and corruption in developing countries with weak rule of law. It explains why this corruption is often chronic and persistent, and further examines its impact on fragility, conflict, and violence. The basic model is built in three stages: (i) political party strategies vis-à-vis clientelist options using a game-theoretical approach, (ii) strategies of using state repression...
انظر المزيد
تفاصيل
-
2023/6/07
-
ورقة عمل خاصة ببحوث السياسات
-
WPS10473
-
1
-
2023/6/07
-
Disclosed
-
Economics of Political Clientelism and Corruption — A Theoretical Pathway
تنزيل الملفات
تقرير كامل
نسخة رسمية من الوثيقة (قد تضم توقيعات، الخ)
-
Total Downloads** : 361