This paper proposes a preliminary
economic model of political clientelism and corruption in
developing countries with weak rule of law. It explains why
this corruption is often chronic and persistent, and further
examines its impact on fragility, conflict, and violence.
The basic model is built in three stages: (i) political
party strategies vis-à-vis clientelist options
using a game-theoretical approach, (ii) strategies of using
state...
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تفاصيل
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2023/6/07
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ورقة عمل خاصة ببحوث السياسات
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WPS10473
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1
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2023/6/07
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Disclosed
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Economics of Political Clientelism and Corruption — A Theoretical Pathway
تنزيل الملفات
تقرير كامل
نسخة رسمية من الوثيقة (قد تضم توقيعات، الخ)
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