This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid...
انظر المزيد
تفاصيل
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2020/9/11
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ورقة عمل خاصة ببحوث السياسات
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WPS9395
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1
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1
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2020/9/11
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Disclosed
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Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
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Teachers