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Information, Loss Framing, and Spillovers in Pay-for-Performance Contracts (الإنجليزية)

Do incentives matter beyond the information conveyed by pay-for-performance contracts? Does loss framing matter? And do incomplete contracts generate spillovers on unincentivized tasks? This study reports on a framed field experiment with 1,363 maternity care workers in 691 primary health facilities in Nigeria to answer these questions. Participants were randomized into three study arms—(1) information with a flat participation fee, (2) performance-based...
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نسخة رسمية من الوثيقة (قد تضم توقيعات، الخ)


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